Subject
From
Date
List
DNSSEC and alternativesDNSSEC and alternatives
Edward Lewis
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/InCgKJFE6_2PuXbgHLHKocRNDUg/
359589
1129548
transfering vs. loading a zonetransfering vs. loading a zone
Edward Lewis
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/oKSY1NFJXsztqFNyx1U3Gog1yrY/
359579
1129549
Re: transfering vs. loading a zoneRe: transfering vs. loading a zone
Mark Andrews
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/qiVta1ISaiOfhA9ztAEf9AVS5YA/
359590
1129549
Re: transfering vs. loading a zoneRe: transfering vs. loading a zone
Masataka Ohta
2008-08-13
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/08kgRf0wBHVXt8eanvt-Es7URSA/
359592
1129549
Re: transfering vs. loading a zoneRe: transfering vs. loading a zone
W.C.A. Wijngaards
2008-08-13
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/NuEdkWAG2av5ab4ew7zI9yC4zYI/
359594
1129549
Re: transfering vs. loading a zoneRe: transfering vs. loading a zone
Edward Lewis
2008-08-13
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/eZtfcEyMijD8SkrXyh1xDbYmW20/
359601
1129549
Re: transfering vs. loading a zoneRe: transfering vs. loading a zone
Mark Andrews
2008-08-13
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/NH1OTF7X5WZ79LKNxU_j2cpPJoE/
359614
1129549
Re: transfering vs. loading a zoneRe: transfering vs. loading a zone
Masataka Ohta
2008-08-14
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/FJ_pbeOmoTJZgtdsCqL4ZtL-6rY/
359618
1129549
request for draft-crocker-dnssec-algo-signal-01 to become WG itemrequest for draft-crocker-dnssec-algo-signal-01 to become WG item
Scott Rose
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/wmN5S9F9kk_yWmZf99wZip-z2v4/
359574
1129550
Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?
Jay R. Ashworth
2008-08-11
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/uR_uycPTOQir3I-xLMpATnllpXs/
359562
1129551
Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?
bert hubert
2008-08-11
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/SbJnRBKMRfp9o8vb8bgrEzK8NdA/
359565
1129551
Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?
Olafur Gudmundsson
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/f3f-leg_A1E4b_H2w9Q5UHd4cis/
359569
1129551
Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?
Paul Vixie
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/Jz1Cm5QicFivuLEP16Yk_oWtU64/
359584
1129551
RE: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?RE: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?
Antoin Verschuren
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/JN3PLpcnb8N8pJQVfEvsoAhpfm0/
359571
1129551
Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]
Peter Koch
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/aJ0_GylJqDBlp2j8PhVJpkPcTX0/
359572
1129551
Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]
Tony Finch
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/iUvbHtJd9CE1E47QH_1ygcn-jr4/
359573
1129551
Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]
Florian Weimer
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/mj6BAnOMaxcC3qPmnbEs6c_rY_Q/
359583
1129551
Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]
Tony Finch
2008-08-13
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/mBies4b9sVpe15RDkKSSCI6qtGc/
359593
1129551
Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]Re: Dealing with the NS RRSet [Re: Why *can* cached DNS replies be overwritten?]
Peter Koch
2008-08-12
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/rdhCUHeUR2q-0TOgHkWANCrvYv0/
359585
1129551
DNSEXT/namedroppers list policyDNSEXT/namedroppers list policy
Ólafur Guðmundsson /DNSEXT chair
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/KYB2J5T4BASDLQCA-FPSrkP4IqM/
359533
1129552
majordomo is brokenmajordomo is broken
Mark_Andrews
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/dBqZOHY_OpRUTnP4RRUGaXfXtPY/
359532
1129553
first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedfirst succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
bert hubert
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/g-tFKqjkiUxycNQnSgUqHd9kWEM/
359528
1129554
Re: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedRe: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
sthaug
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/Dhp4UK0-0qv8AhJc7yA6S-WXbsQ/
359529
1129554
Re: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedRe: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
Jeroen Massar
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/sIj-MNkWMx-X7EChqlYzT4cOYoc/
359530
1129554
Re: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedRe: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
Ondřej Surý
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/B7MkPKAMkwaJkY5mxWvJO3zBMrw/
359534
1129554
Re: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedRe: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
Jeroen Massar
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/TBvYw30Rj7Bj2Pb5_MU2hVafWVw/
359536
1129554
Re: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedRe: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
sthaug
2008-08-10
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/KjxL7NXo4r-nos0Jqh_LgtC8XgM/
359545
1129554
Re: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedRe: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
Alex Bligh
2008-08-10
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/9nZKOm4Gn1XcNuK8gwARX-6HQYg/
359547
1129554
Re: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reportedRe: first succesful (lab) spoof of a fully source port randomized server reported
Paul Vixie
2008-08-10
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/vD-y5j_AbpzhVstcHs6VtbPAgYA/
359559
1129554
The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Duane
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/u0F4aCsPjq_f7qVhNy5RE4mLECw/
359494
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
David Ulevitch
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/2nseOuQlqRwMbe3Cb7k9zQYO0CM/
359496
1129556
Re: list policiesRe: list policies
Duane at e164 dot org
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/YYSjTqnMb7l_g-5VL64hmgfI97o/
359499
1129556
Re: list policiesRe: list policies
bmanning
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/uUAL0Ki0Z-ddaiHrykmtyT0WW4U/
359538
1129556
Re: list policiesRe: list policies
Duane at e164 dot org
2008-08-09
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/LmHXjEwMYp6bK7d61x-KihvEplM/
359540
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Duane at e164 dot org
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/NLZq2uDeOtn9UhQn_6w2rGb9KI8/
359513
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Ondřej Surý
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/4ePGMVEKlRSWgf3RICsYsyiLvzM/
359514
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Duane at e164 dot org
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/sjo4G7RGudPyTUpts0RRnCrfDJg/
359515
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Ondřej Surý
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/go9D-Q9cTJJZqlMlMj7ckDlhLXk/
359517
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Duane at e164 dot org
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/wnTa95owAjDy4bHZA-De09JR6Xs/
359518
1129556
Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.Re: The problem I see with DNSSEC as a potential end user and administrator.
Ondřej Surý
2008-08-08
dnsext
/arch/msg/dnsext/DNB7f6hNS2bdxWMglsG1fhOGrck/
359521
1129556