httpbisa

draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10

Martin Thomson

2017-02-01

Re: draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10Re: draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10

Mark Nottingham

2017-02-01

RE: draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10RE: draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10

Mike Bishop

2017-02-01

draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10: Example 2.1. Alternative Server Opt-Indraft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10: Example 2.1. Alternative Server Opt-In

Kari Hurtta

2017-02-02

Re: draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10: Example 2.1. Alternative Server Opt-InRe: draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10: Example 2.1. Alternative Server Opt-In

Martin Thomson

2017-02-03

draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10: 2.3. The "http-opportunistic" well-known URI / cache-controldraft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10: 2.3. The "http-opportunistic" well-known URI / cache-control

Kari Hurtta

2017-02-04

Re: draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10: 2.3. The "http-opportunistic" well-known URI / cache-controlRe: draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10: 2.3. The "http-opportunistic" well-known URI / cache-control

Martin Thomson

2017-02-05

Re: draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10: 2.3. The "http-opportunistic" well-known URI / cache-controlRe: draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10: 2.3. The "http-opportunistic" well-known URI / cache-control

Kari Hurtta

2017-02-05

draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10

Kari Hurtta

2017-02-06

Re: draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10Re: draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10

Martin Thomson

2017-02-06

I-D Action: draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10.txtI-D Action: draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-encryption-10.txt

internet-drafts

2017-02-01

RE: Change to padding in encryption -- examples look okRE: Change to padding in encryption -- examples look ok

Manger, James

2017-01-31

Re: Change to padding in encryption -- examples look okRe: Change to padding in encryption -- examples look ok

Martin Thomson

2017-01-31

RE: Change to padding in encryption -- enabling random accessRE: Change to padding in encryption -- enabling random access

Manger, James

2017-01-30

Re: Change to padding in encryption -- enabling random accessRe: Change to padding in encryption -- enabling random access

Martin Thomson

2017-01-30

RE: Change to padding in encryption -- enabling random accessRE: Change to padding in encryption -- enabling random access

Manger, James

2017-01-30

Re: Change to padding in encryption -- enabling random accessRe: Change to padding in encryption -- enabling random access

Martin Thomson

2017-01-30

Change to padding in encryptionChange to padding in encryption

Martin Thomson

2017-01-30

HTTP/2 plaintext upgradeHTTP/2 plaintext upgrade

Cory Benfield

2017-01-26

Re: HTTP/2 plaintext upgradeRe: HTTP/2 plaintext upgrade

Loïc Hoguin

2017-01-26

Re: HTTP/2 plaintext upgradeRe: HTTP/2 plaintext upgrade

Daniel Stenberg

2017-01-26

Re: HTTP/2 plaintext upgradeRe: HTTP/2 plaintext upgrade

Kazuho Oku

2017-01-27

[ietf-http-wg] <none>[ietf-http-wg] <none>

geronimotita

2017-01-26

[Errata Rejected] RFC7231 (4734)[Errata Rejected] RFC7231 (4734)

RFC Errata System

2017-01-25

[ietf-http-wg] <none>[ietf-http-wg] <none>

geronimotita

2017-01-24

Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?

Tom Bergan

2017-01-24

Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?

Kazuho Oku

2017-01-24

Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?

Kazu Yamamoto ( 山本和彦 )

2017-01-24

Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?

Stefan Eissing

2017-01-24

Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?

Tom Bergan

2017-01-24

Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?

Kazu Yamamoto ( 山本和彦 )

2017-01-24

Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?

Tom Bergan

2017-01-24

Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?

Patrick McManus

2017-01-24

Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?

Amos Jeffries

2017-01-26

Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?

Kazu Yamamoto ( 山本和彦 )

2017-01-25

Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?

Kazuho Oku

2017-01-25

Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?

Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa

2017-01-25

Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?

Cory Benfield

2017-01-25

Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?Re: Is a faithful HTTP/2 response scheduler necessarily O(n) in the worst case?

Stefan Eissing

2017-01-25

aes128gcm: vulnerable to truncation attacksaes128gcm: vulnerable to truncation attacks

Manger, James

2017-01-23

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