tls

[TLS] [Errata Held for Document Update] RFC7905 (5251)[TLS] [Errata Held for Document Update] RFC7905 (5251)

RFC Errata System

2024-03-18

Re: [TLS] TLS Digest, Vol 223, Issue 7Re: [TLS] TLS Digest, Vol 223, Issue 7

Duke Abbaddon

2023-02-09

Re: [TLS] I know TLS Device & Radio & BT protocol, For such things as mice & keyboards & Game-Pads, Could propose AES & PSK, Can you see ECDHE Being used ? maybe Preshare & seeded PSK is better, Can we make a protocol TLS for devices ?Re: [TLS] I know TLS Device & Radio & BT protocol, For such things as mice & keyboards & Game-Pads, Could propose AES & PSK, Can you see ECDHE Being used ? maybe Preshare & seeded PSK is better, Can we make a protocol TLS for devices ?

Achim Kraus

2023-02-06

[TLS] I know TLS Device & Radio & BT protocol, For such things as mice & keyboards & Game-Pads, Could propose AES & PSK, Can you see ECDHE Being used ? maybe Preshare & seeded PSK is better, Can we make a protocol TLS for devices ?[TLS] I know TLS Device & Radio & BT protocol, For such things as mice & keyboards & Game-Pads, Could propose AES & PSK, Can you see ECDHE Being used ? maybe Preshare & seeded PSK is better, Can we make a protocol TLS for devices ?

Duke Abbaddon

2023-02-06

Re: [TLS] Fwd: These pdf research documents on elliptic curves are a harder read, i am conversant with classic algebra, can you work them out into Open Source Code for Miracl security C++ & other windows and linux libraries, converting these World class Elliptic curves would earn a lot of linux, windows & IETF.org and NIST Credit, faithfully yours RSRe: [TLS] Fwd: These pdf research documents on elliptic curves are a harder read, i am conversant with classic algebra, can you work them out into Open Source Code for Miracl security C++ & other windows and linux libraries, converting these World class Elliptic curves would earn a lot of linux, windows & IETF.org and NIST Credit, faithfully yours RS

Christopher Wood

2023-01-29

[TLS] Fwd: These pdf research documents on elliptic curves are a harder read, i am conversant with classic algebra, can you work them out into Open Source Code for Miracl security C++ & other windows and linux libraries, converting these World class Elliptic curves would earn a lot of linux, windows & IETF.org and NIST Credit, faithfully yours RS[TLS] Fwd: These pdf research documents on elliptic curves are a harder read, i am conversant with classic algebra, can you work them out into Open Source Code for Miracl security C++ & other windows and linux libraries, converting these World class Elliptic curves would earn a lot of linux, windows & IETF.org and NIST Credit, faithfully yours RS

Duke Abbaddon

2023-01-29

[TLS] TLS Research documentation; for the proposal & ratification of Post Quantum & ECDHE Protocols with elliptic curves & EEC S-Box - RS 2023-01[TLS] TLS Research documentation; for the proposal & ratification of Post Quantum & ECDHE Protocols with elliptic curves & EEC S-Box - RS 2023-01

Duke Abbaddon

2023-01-29

[TLS] Light-weight TLS & Elliptic security for assessments & update of PQC & TLS with my own work also but also further reading i have done : RS[TLS] Light-weight TLS & Elliptic security for assessments & update of PQC & TLS with my own work also but also further reading i have done : RS

Duke Abbaddon

2023-01-26

[TLS] tls key sharing agreement : RS I have regarded the tls key sharing agreement & it occurs to me that all modes may be improved with combination of a Nonce-PSK-Type-Key, For example held by the verifying certificate agency such as lets encrypt & SafeSSL & Cloudflare, Submitting a lightly cyphered PSK Key would take milliseconds & consume only 10000th of a second on GB/S Ethernet & therefor be unnoticeable and thus secure for the initiation encounter (c)Rupert S[TLS] tls key sharing agreement : RS I have regarded the tls key sharing agreement & it occurs to me that all modes may be improved with combination of a Nonce-PSK-Type-Key, For example held by the verifying certificate agency such as lets encrypt & SafeSSL & Cloudflare, Submitting a lightly cyphered PSK Key would take milliseconds & consume only 10000th of a second on GB/S Ethernet & therefor be unnoticeable and thus secure for the initiation encounter (c)Rupert S

Duke Abbaddon

2023-01-25

Re: [TLS] Regarding draft-bartle-tls-deprecate-ffdheRe: [TLS] Regarding draft-bartle-tls-deprecate-ffdhe

Carrick Bartle

2021-03-09

Re: [TLS] Regarding draft-bartle-tls-deprecate-ffdheRe: [TLS] Regarding draft-bartle-tls-deprecate-ffdhe

Viktor Dukhovni

2021-03-09

[TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-41.txt> (The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard[TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-41.txt> (The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

The IESG

2021-02-08

Re: [TLS] AD Evaluation of draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-39Re: [TLS] AD Evaluation of draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-39

Benjamin Kaduk

2021-02-06

Re: [TLS] AD Evaluation of draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-39Re: [TLS] AD Evaluation of draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-39

Eric Rescorla

2020-12-07

Re: [TLS] A new draft for "Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS)" has been updatedRe: [TLS] A new draft for "Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS)" has been updated

Wang Haiguang

2019-01-17

Re: [TLS] A new draft for "Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS)" has been updatedRe: [TLS] A new draft for "Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS)" has been updated

Wang Haiguang

2018-12-27

Re: [TLS] A new draft for "Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS)" has been updatedRe: [TLS] A new draft for "Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS)" has been updated

Ilari Liusvaara

2018-12-26

Re: [TLS] Mail regarding draft-ietf-tls-tls13Re: [TLS] Mail regarding draft-ietf-tls-tls13

Ilari Liusvaara

2018-06-20

Re: [TLS] UPDATED Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed StandardRe: [TLS] UPDATED Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

Sean Turner

2018-02-16

[TLS] UPDATED Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard[TLS] UPDATED Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

The IESG

2018-02-16

[TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC7905 (5251)[TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC7905 (5251)

RFC Errata System

2018-02-01

Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)

Russ Housley

2017-03-10

Re: [TLS] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)Re: [TLS] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)

Sean Turner

2017-03-10

Re: [TLS] Last call comments and WG Chair review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aeadRe: [TLS] Last call comments and WG Chair review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead

Thomas Pornin

2017-03-01

Re: [TLS] Last call comments and WG Chair review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aeadRe: [TLS] Last call comments and WG Chair review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead

Joseph Salowey

2017-02-24

Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)

Dang, Quynh (Fed)

2017-02-10

Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)

Rene Struik

2017-02-10

Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)

Dang, Quynh (Fed)

2017-02-10

Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)

Rene Struik

2017-02-10

Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] Closing out tls1.3 "Limits on key usage" PRs (#765/#769)

Dang, Quynh (Fed)

2017-02-10

[TLS] [Errata Verified] RFC5288 (4694)[TLS] [Errata Verified] RFC5288 (4694)

RFC Errata System

2016-11-24

Re: [TLS] Milestones changed for tls WGRe: [TLS] Milestones changed for tls WG

Sean Turner

2016-10-06

[TLS] Milestones changed for tls WG[TLS] Milestones changed for tls WG

IETF Secretariat

2016-10-06

Re: [TLS] New draft: draft-ietf-tls-tls13-14.txtRe: [TLS] New draft: draft-ietf-tls-tls13-14.txt

Ilari Liusvaara

2016-07-12

Re: [TLS] RFC 7905 on ChaCha20-Poly1305 Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)Re: [TLS] RFC 7905 on ChaCha20-Poly1305 Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)

Sean Turner

2016-06-23

[TLS] RFC 7905 on ChaCha20-Poly1305 Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)[TLS] RFC 7905 on ChaCha20-Poly1305 Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)

rfc-editor

2016-06-22

[TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5288 (4694)[TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5288 (4694)

RFC Errata System

2016-05-14

[TLS] Protocol Action: 'ChaCha20-Poly1305 Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)' to Proposed Standard (draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04.txt)[TLS] Protocol Action: 'ChaCha20-Poly1305 Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)' to Proposed Standard (draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04.txt)

The IESG

2016-05-09

Re: [TLS] Alexey Melnikov's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04: (with COMMENT)Re: [TLS] Alexey Melnikov's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04: (with COMMENT)

Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos

2016-05-06

Re: [TLS] Alexey Melnikov's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04: (with COMMENT)Re: [TLS] Alexey Melnikov's Yes on draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04: (with COMMENT)

Jeffrey Walton

2016-05-05

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