Re: [5gangip] [DMM] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt

[Behcet Sarikaya <[e-mail]>]

Again in the spirit of clean cc list :-)

On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 10:33 AM, Tom Herbert <[e-mail]> wrote:

> On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 8:19 AM, Jon Crowcroft
> <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > beware of sidechannel attacks - eg. a sequence of efficient routes can
> > determine a sequence of locations just from latency/rtt estimation
> > (observe outbound data and likely return path ack packets) - you want
> > privacy, you're gonna pay
> >
>

Jon, let's have it and see what the price is to pay, then we can consider
the next steps.

Behcet

>
> Yep, we also know there is a lot of effort being done to extract
> information from cipher text like apply machine learning to the data.
> As compute and data acquisition techniques advance, attacks on the
> Internet only get more sophisticated. Work will always be needed to
> mitigate new attacks and that will have cost. It's a never ending
> problem, but it's worth it to continually try to solve IMHO.
>
> Tom
>
>
> > On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 5:14 PM, Tom Herbert <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >> On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 10:01 PM, Jon Crowcroft
> >> <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >>> what we need is compact onion routing - maybe we could call it garlic
> routing.
> >>>
> >>> in all seriousness, if people are worried about privacy with regards
> >>> network operators, or state actors co-ercing network operators, at
> >>> this level, that is what you want. otherwise forget about efficient
> >>> mobile routing - the fact is that the signature of the set of
> >>> locations you visit is enough to re-identify a node pretty quickly -
> >>> its been done (see wetherall's work on this a few years back on simply
> >>> looking at sequences of wifi AP associations, without bothing with end
> >>> system mac addr, to uniquely matc individual (indeed, find their home)
> >>> - you have to get the threat model appropriately...and proportioately
> >>
> >> Jon,
> >>
> >> The threat is not limited to coming from network operators, it is
> >> basically from the whole Internet. IP addresses must be sent as clear
> >> text, and when they encode personally identifiable information then
> >> that can be used by third parties to compromise privacy. In mobile
> >> addresses, the threat is both comprising identity and location of the
> >> user. Identity can be compromised when the same address (or device
> >> specific prefix in case of RFC4941 addresses) is reused for different
> >> flows, location is compromised when an address encodes a locator that
> >> can be used to determine specific location. There are publicized
> >> examples of third parties using IP addresses to expose identity and
> >> location (e.g. https://theintercept.com/2018/03/26/facebook-data-ice-
> immigration/).
> >>
> >> In order to provide privacy in addressing, IP addresses need to be
> >> purged of PII. This likely entails minimizing aggregation and a high
> >> frequency of address change in a host. On the surface, this does seem
> >> to be in conflict with "efficient mobile routing" as you mentioned,
> >> however I don't believe that efficient routing is an acceptable trade
> >> off for not providing adequate privacy to users. Alternatives that
> >> achieve both goals should be investigated.
> >> draft-herbert-ipv6-prefix-address-privacy-00 suggests "hidden
> >> aggregation" as one possibility.
> >>
> >> Tom
> >>
> >>>
> >>> On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 11:42 PM, Erik Nordmark <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> This is a rough draft, but hopefully it can stimulate more discussion
> around
> >>>> privacy considerations.
> >>>>
> >>>> -------- Forwarded Message --------
> >>>> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-
> 00.txt
> >>>> Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 15:34:11 -0700
> >>>> From: [e-mail]
> >>>> To: Erik Nordmark <[e-mail]>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> A new version of I-D, draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt
> >>>> has been successfully submitted by Erik Nordmark and posted to the
> >>>> IETF repository.
> >>>>
> >>>> Name:           draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy
> >>>> Revision:       00
> >>>> Title:          Privacy issues in ID/locator separation systems
> >>>> Document date:  2018-07-02
> >>>> Group:          Individual Submission
> >>>> Pages:          6
> >>>> URL:
> >>>> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-nordmark-id-loc-
> privacy-00.txt
> >>>> Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nordmark-id-loc-
> privacy/
> >>>> Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/
> draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00
> >>>> Htmlized:
> >>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Abstract:
> >>>>    There exists several protocols and proposals for identifier/locator
> >>>>    split which have some form of control plane by which participating
> >>>>    nodes can use to share their current id to locator information with
> >>>>    their peers.  This document explores some of the privacy
> >>>>    considerations for such a system.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission
> >>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> >>>>
> >>>> The IETF Secretariat
> >>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> 5gangip mailing list
> >>>> [e-mail]
> >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip
> >>>
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> >>
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