[6lowapp] Security and Commissioning

Cullen Jennings <fluffy@cisco.com> Sat, 31 October 2009 17:33 UTC

Return-Path: <fluffy@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: 6lowapp@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: 6lowapp@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5594D3A6934 for <6lowapp@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 31 Oct 2009 10:33:34 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.367
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.367 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.232, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ceInmZPLNjPK for <6lowapp@core3.amsl.com>; Sat, 31 Oct 2009 10:33:33 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ams-iport-1.cisco.com (ams-iport-1.cisco.com [144.254.224.140]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3479F3A691D for <6lowapp@ietf.org>; Sat, 31 Oct 2009 10:33:33 -0700 (PDT)
Authentication-Results: ams-iport-1.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AjgAAKoR7EqQ/uCWe2dsb2JhbACbUwEBFiQGqBaXeIQ5BA
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,659,1249257600"; d="scan'208";a="53281441"
Received: from ams-core-1.cisco.com ([144.254.224.150]) by ams-iport-1.cisco.com with ESMTP; 31 Oct 2009 17:33:50 +0000
Received: from ams3-vpn-dhcp4750.cisco.com (ams3-vpn-dhcp4750.cisco.com [10.61.82.141]) by ams-core-1.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id n9VHXSjL024626 for <6lowapp@ietf.org>; Sat, 31 Oct 2009 17:33:49 GMT
From: Cullen Jennings <fluffy@cisco.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed; delsp=yes
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2009 11:33:49 -0600
Message-Id: <671E1ECE-D232-47B0-B8B0-DF354A7514EB@cisco.com>
To: 6lowapp@ietf.org
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1076)
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1076)
Subject: [6lowapp] Security and Commissioning
X-BeenThere: 6lowapp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Application protocols for constrained nodes and networks <6lowapp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/6lowapp>, <mailto:6lowapp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/6lowapp>
List-Post: <mailto:6lowapp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:6lowapp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/6lowapp>, <mailto:6lowapp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2009 17:33:34 -0000

Consider one of the use cases several people have discussed. You  
install a new light. You install a new light switch. Now, how do you  
bind them together in the type of deployments where you want security?

One way or another we need to meet the requirements of BCP 61. For  
many BOFs, how they will BCP 61 is fairly obvious and no one worries  
about it. However, for this BOF, it is not obvious. To get to a WG, I  
think we need to have enough of a sketch of how we are going to do the  
security that we can convince the security folks that we are not  
insane and that we will be able to meet the requirements of BCP 61 in  
the protocols developed. This duckling imprint approach was a stawman  
approach to this but it may be totally  useless and not what we want  
to in which case we should promptly eject it from the charter.

The question is, what are we going to do? Ideas? Can someone sketch  
out at the back of a cocktail napkin level enough of an idea on the  
one or more ways we want to deal wit this? If we agree on that I can  
do my best to figure out how to get that into the charter in a way  
that convinces the security people that they don't have to show up and  
say No.