Re: [6lowpan] New Version Notification for draft-qiu-roll-kemp: Do need an alternative security design ?

QIU Ying <qiuying@i2r.a-star.edu.sg> Wed, 31 October 2012 16:49 UTC

Return-Path: <qiuying@i2r.a-star.edu.sg>
X-Original-To: 6lowpan@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: 6lowpan@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2C3AF21F878E; Wed, 31 Oct 2012 09:49:56 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id tQwmNjzO6nVZ; Wed, 31 Oct 2012 09:49:55 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from gw1.scei.a-star.edu.sg (gw1.scei.a-star.edu.sg [192.122.140.10]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AD76E21F878D; Wed, 31 Oct 2012 09:49:54 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from S3-CAS05.shared-svc.local ([10.217.253.201]) by gw1.scei.a-star.edu.sg (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id q9VGnngP026253; Thu, 1 Nov 2012 00:49:50 +0800
Received: from Win7PC (10.217.253.130) by S3-CAS05.shared-svc.local (10.217.253.201) with Microsoft SMTP Server id 14.1.339.1; Thu, 1 Nov 2012 00:49:48 +0800
From: QIU Ying <qiuying@i2r.a-star.edu.sg>
To: "'Rene Struik'" <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>
References: <02a001cdb5ee$e34164d0$a9c42e70$@a-star.edu.sg> <508ECA68.4030402@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <508ECA68.4030402@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 00:56:16 +0800
Message-ID: <036901cdb788$a481d5e0$ed8581a0$@a-star.edu.sg>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0
Thread-Index: Ac22Awuizrt3ftb5Rx6RXh5Wrj8ExwBg8lOw
Content-Language: en-sg
X-Originating-IP: [10.217.253.130]
X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:5.7.7855, 1.0.431, 0.0.0000 definitions=2012-10-31_03:2012-10-31, 2012-10-31, 1970-01-01 signatures=0
X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 spamscore=0 ipscore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=6.0.2-1203120001 definitions=main-1210310162
Cc: roll@ietf.org, 6lowpan@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [6lowpan] New Version Notification for draft-qiu-roll-kemp: Do need an alternative security design ?
X-BeenThere: 6lowpan@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Working group discussion for IPv6 over LowPan networks <6lowpan.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/6lowpan>, <mailto:6lowpan-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/6lowpan>
List-Post: <mailto:6lowpan@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:6lowpan-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/6lowpan>, <mailto:6lowpan-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2012 16:49:56 -0000

Hi, Rene

Thanks for your comments.

The discussion of using public keys in MIP6 WG was much more than the
description in RFC 4225, e.g. the lack of global PKI, the key revocation,
etc. These issues also restricted to accept the public key schemes in MIPv6
since a mobile device are always roaming and lost easily. 

Regarding the scalability, according to my understanding, for example IKE, a
pre-configured security policy (SP), which based on the home address of
mobile devices, is needed before IKE exchange procedure. The
pre-configuration is lack of scalability as the visiting mobile devices
could be from any locations or any domains. 

The IKE scheme is only solve the issue of authentication between the mobile
device and the correspondent node. It cannot ensure that a mobile device is
reachable from other nodes.

"resource utilization": did you mean the limited capability of mobile
devices? I cannot remember if there are a lot of words on the capability in
the MIPv6 specification. I thought it is not practice to involve the
revocation checking in a mobile device. Anyway, the capability issue is much
more sensitive in LLNs than in mobile networks.

Your observation is correct that "get lots of message traffic to/from this
third party and its local neighbours" because need more hops. In KEMP
protocol, using the base station as the trust third party is only in the
bootstraps phase (or at a specified interval).  In the following update
phases, the distribution mode should be employed. In the distribution mode,
the previous neighbour router is role as the trust 3rd party to introduce
the moving sensor to the next neighbour router. In this case, the total hops
could reduce to 3. By the way, in the public key scheme, the extra messages
/ communications are required when the certifications need to update.

I hope that the above explanation could be express the actual concept of the
MIPv6 authors, not just on my own understanding ;)

Regards
Qiu Ying


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Rene Struik [mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2012 2:27 AM
> To: QIU Ying
> Cc: roll@ietf.org; 6lowpan@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [6lowpan] New Version Notification for draft-qiu-roll-kemp:
> Do need an alternative security design ?
> 
> Hi Qiu:
> 
> Just curious: could you elaborate a little bit on the RFC 4225, Section
> 5.2 remark below? I just would like to understand scalability, resource
> utilization, and other issues somewhat better and may have missed
> something here. In particular, if one uses a symmetric-key scheme with
> online involvement  of a trusted party who distributes pairwise keying
> material, doesn't one then get lots of message traffic to/from this
> third party and its local neighbors for each protocol instantiation?
> 
> On a more general note, agreed there is a need to tackle trust life
> cycle management in a dedicated forum. Originally, I thought the Smart
> Object Security Workshop (which we had end of March 2012, just prior to
> the IETF meeting) would be a good forum to tackle issues, but felt we
> missed some opportunities there to bring forward an agenda of things to
> accomplish (in my mind, there was too much inside the box thinking in
> terms of "tweaks to IETF drafts"), with less emphasis on what makes
> ubiquitous networking different from a deployment use case perspective
> (e.g., the lighting use case example comes to mind).
> 
> Unfortunately, I will not be at the Atlanta meeting, though I might be
> in Vancouver. Glad to contribute to call to action there.
> 
> Best regards, Rene
> 
> On 10/29/2012 12:03 PM, QIU Ying wrote:
> > Dear all,
> >
> > Do need an alternative security design instead of the current public
> key protocols in key establishment? It's one of arguments in previous
> WG meeting.
> >
> > My answer is yes. Actually, the similar discussion had been raised in
> mobile IPv6 WG (RFC4225).
> >
> > Besides the authentication, another major check is the reachability
> checking to verify if the claimed mobile node is reachable (section
> 4.1). RFC4225 also explains why the current Public Key Infrastructure
> (i.e. IKE) is not accepted in mobile IPv6 (section 5.2).
> >
> > Frankly, the scheme used in KEMP is not fresh new. It is in style of
> the popular Kerberos. Instead of sending the ticket to visiting server
> from client directly in Kerberos, the ticket is sent to the visiting
> server (new nearby router in KEMP) from the KDC (base station in KEMP).
> The benefit of this modification includes: 1) reduce the communication;
> 2) the client (mobile node in KEMP) is check if reachable from the 3rd
> party (new nearby router); 3) revocation in time.
> >
> > Thank to many WG participants commenting on the draft (inclusive Rene
> Struik, Steve Childress, Shoichi Sakane, Greg Zaverucha, Matthew
> Campagna), the draft should be more mature and stronger.
> >
> > Regards
> > Qiu Ying
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: QIU Ying [mailto:qiuying@i2r.a-star.edu.sg]
> >> Sent: Tuesday, October 23, 2012 11:57 AM
> >> To: 'roll@ietf.org'org'; '6lowpan@ietf.org'
> >> Subject: FW: New Version Notification for draft-qiu-roll-kemp-02.txt
> >>
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> The KEMP draft is updated. The messages in the draft will be carried
> >> in KMP format proposed by IEEE802.15.9 working group so that the
> KEMP
> >> protocol is compatible with IEEE802.15.9 and could be deployed in
> >> layer 2.
> >>
> >> Regards
> >> Qiu Ying
> >>
> >>
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >>
> >> A new version of I-D, draft-qiu-roll-kemp-02.txt has been
> >> successfully submitted by Ying Qiu and posted to the IETF repository.
> >>
> >> Filename:	 draft-qiu-roll-kemp
> >> Revision:	 02
> >> Title:		 Lightweight Key Establishment and Management
> >> Protocol in Dynamic Sensor Networks (KEMP)
> >> Creation date:	 2012-10-22
> >> WG ID:		 Individual Submission
> >> Number of pages: 20
> >> URL:             http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-qiu-roll-
> >> kemp-02.txt
> >> Status:          http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-qiu-roll-kemp
> >> Htmlized:        http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-qiu-roll-kemp-02
> >> Diff:            http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-qiu-roll-
> kemp-
> >> 02
> >>
> >> Abstract:
> >>    When a sensor node roams within a very large and distributed
> >> wireless
> >>    sensor network, which consists of numerous sensor nodes, its
> routing
> >>    path and neighborhood keep changing.  In order to provide a high
> >>    level of security in this environment, the moving sensor node
> needs
> >>    to be authenticated to new neighboring nodes as well as to
> establish
> >>    a key for secure communication.  The document proposes an
> efficient
> >>    and scalable protocol to establish and update the secure key in a
> >>    dynamic wireless sensor network environment.  The protocol
> >> guarantees
> >>    that two sensor nodes share at least one key with probability 1
> >>    (100%) with less memory and energy cost, while not causing
> >>    considerable communication overhead.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> The IETF Secretariat
> > Institute for Infocomm Research disclaimer:  "This email is
> confidential and may be privileged. If you are not the intended
> recipient, please delete it and notify us immediately. Please do not
> copy or use it for any purpose, or disclose its contents to any other
> person. Thank you."
> > _______________________________________________
> > 6lowpan mailing list
> > 6lowpan@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/6lowpan
> 
> 
> --
> email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
> cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363

Institute for Infocomm Research disclaimer:  "This email is confidential and may be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete it and notify us immediately. Please do not copy or use it for any purpose, or disclose its contents to any other person. Thank you."