Re: [6tisch-security] some proposed changes to 6tisch-minimal-security
Mališa Vučinić <malisa.vucinic@inria.fr> Fri, 10 March 2017 12:11 UTC
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From: Mališa Vučinić <malisa.vucinic@inria.fr>
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Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 13:10:49 +0100
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To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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Subject: Re: [6tisch-security] some proposed changes to 6tisch-minimal-security
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> On 09 Mar 2017, at 23:46, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> wrote: > > > This makes it clear how the pledge should process the EB: > > https://bitbucket.org/mcr314/draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security/commits/78b8e6455dc9500c7c0de43960f282ccb9529d24 > > +A pledge which receives only Enhanced Beacons containing Network ID extensions > +{{I-D.richardson-6tisch-join-enhanced-beacon}} with the initiate bit cleared, SHOULD NOT > +proceed with this protocol on that network. The pledge SHOULD consider that it > +is in a network which manages join traffic, it SHOULD switch to {{I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join}}. Sounds good. What happens in the case when the EB does not contain Network ID extensions. Should we just default to minimal? > This makes it clearer that certificates do not necessarily mean that it is a > zero-touch case: if they are locally relevant, then it's just a rejoin after a long sleep. > > https://bitbucket.org/mcr314/draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security/commits/e283fd274ab2d4ee8e0d1a3467f27d4d1dc3963f > > REQUIRED for RPKs and certificates. > + > +When using certificates, the process continues as described in {{I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe}}, > +but MAY result in no network key being returned. In that case, the pledge enters a > +provisional situation where it provides access to an enrollment mechanism described in > +{{I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join}}. > + > +If using a locally relevant certificate, the pledge will be able to validate the > +certificate of the JRC via a local trust anchor. In that case, the JRC will > +return networks keys as in the PSK case. This would typically be the case for > +a device which has slept so long that it no longer has valid network keys and must go through > +a partial join process again. I am confused here. A node that sleeps so long that it no longer has valid network keys can just repeat the Simple Join Protocol, i.e. the join request/response exchange. It does not need to perform a new EDHOC handshake because we can assume that the session key with JRC is still valid, no? > This makes it clearer that the mechanism is not limited to AES-CCM, but that > negotiation could occur via EDHOC: > > https://bitbucket.org/mcr314/draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security/commits/627b2bff648ccb9ec47c59d0cd8d710d9b64742b > > +The join request is typically authenticated/encrypted end-to-end using AES-CCM-16-64-128 > +algorithm from {{I-D.ietf-cose-msg}} and a key derived from > the shared secret from step 3. > +This is described in detail in {{I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe}}, which also provides for algorithm agility. Good catch for crypto agility. Will you make a pull request with these changes so that I can integrate them before publishing -02? Mališa
- [6tisch-security] some proposed changes to 6tisch… Michael Richardson
- Re: [6tisch-security] some proposed changes to 6t… Mališa Vučinić
- Re: [6tisch-security] some proposed changes to 6t… Michael Richardson