Re: [6tisch] ASN replay attack -- proposed text

[Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>]

> At the time of the synchronization, the EB frame can neither be authenticated
> nor its freshness verified.

I suggest:

> At the time of the synchronization, the EB frame can neither be authenticated
> nor its freshness verified.  An attacker could have fabricated the EB, or
> may have simply replayed a previous EB (see RFC7416, many sections,
> including section-7.3.5). The pledge has no way to know at this point.

I think that you should move the attack description earlier.
The attack described is a kind of wormhole MITM attack, and I think it is
useful to reference 7416.

> that is normally in use in the network.

this is probably too vague.  I think it's the active K1.

- The frames should be passed to the upper layer for processing using the
- promiscuous mode of {{IEEE802.15.4}} or another appropriate mechanism.

+ The pledge should be placed into promiscuous mode of {{IEEE802.15.4}}
+ (or another appropriate mechanism implementation specific mechanism)
+ in order that they can be passed to the upper layer for processing
+ despite the frames failing the security check due to lack of a key.

{I can put these into github if you like, but I will finish reading the
thread first}

-- 
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks [
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        |    IoT architect   [
]     [e-mail]  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails    [