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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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Subject: Re: [6tisch] ASN replay attack -- proposed text
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> At the time of the synchronization, the EB frame can neither be authentic=
ated
> nor its freshness verified.

I suggest:

> At the time of the synchronization, the EB frame can neither be authentic=
ated
> nor its freshness verified.  An attacker could have fabricated the EB, or
> may have simply replayed a previous EB (see RFC7416, many sections,
> including section-7.3.5). The pledge has no way to know at this point.

I think that you should move the attack description earlier.
The attack described is a kind of wormhole MITM attack, and I think it is
useful to reference 7416.

> that is normally in use in the network.

this is probably too vague.  I think it's the active K1.

=2D The frames should be passed to the upper layer for processing using the
=2D promiscuous mode of {{IEEE802.15.4}} or another appropriate mechanism.

+ The pledge should be placed into promiscuous mode of {{IEEE802.15.4}}
+ (or another appropriate mechanism implementation specific mechanism)
+ in order that they can be passed to the upper layer for processing
+ despite the frames failing the security check due to lack of a key.

{I can put these into github if you like, but I will finish reading the
thread first}

=2D-=20
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh network=
s [
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        |    IoT architect =
  [
]     mcr@sandelman.ca  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails  =
  [




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