Re: [6tisch] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01.txt

Yasuyuki Tanaka <yasuyuki.tanaka@inria.fr> Thu, 21 March 2019 16:29 UTC

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From: Yasuyuki Tanaka <yasuyuki.tanaka@inria.fr>
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Subject: Re: [6tisch] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01.txt
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Hi Marco,

I'd like to ask you to help me understand the attack (>_<)

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01#section-3.2
 > 3.2.  Attack Example
 >
 > (snip)
 >
 >    2.  The adversary picks a channel 'f*' at random, and monitors it for
 >        N_C consecutive slotframes to determine the timeslots in which
 >        the victim node communicates on that channel.  Due to the usage
 >        property, the number of such timeslots is equal to the number of
 >        cells assigned to the victim node.

How does the adversary identify communication of the victim? It
assumes the adversary knows the EUI-64 address of the victim in
advance, or the adversary randomly picks out a victim node?

If the adversary attacks based on a target EUI-64 address, it seems
using EUI-16 (short) address which can be assigned through the join
process could mitigate the attack.

 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-09#section-10

I'm wondering how severe the attack is...

Best,
Yatch

On 12/17/2018 12:38 PM, Marco Tiloca wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> We have just submitted a new version of our draft describing how to 
> alter the communication pattern of network nodes to counteract selective 
> jamming.
> 
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01
> 
> This update especially addresses the comments from IETF 103, by 
> clarifying the attack importance and the adversary model. Also, the 
> draft is now aligned with the CoJP Join Response from the latest minimal 
> security framework.
> 
> Comments are welcome!
> 
> Thanks,
> /Marco
> 
> 
> -------- Forwarded Message --------
> Subject: 	New Version Notification for 
> draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01.txt
> Date: 	Mon, 17 Dec 2018 03:27:31 -0800
> From: 	internet-drafts@ietf.org
> To: 	Marco Tiloca <marco.tiloca@ri.se>se>, Gianluca Dini 
> <gianluca.dini@unipi.it>it>, Simon Duquennoy 
> <simon.duquennoy@yanzinetworks.com>
> 
> 
> 
> 
> A new version of I-D, draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Marco Tiloca and posted to the
> IETF repository.
> 
> Name: draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling
> Revision: 01
> Title: Robust Scheduling against Selective Jamming in 6TiSCH Networks
> Document date: 2018-12-17
> Group: Individual Submission
> Pages: 15
> URL: 
> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01.txt
> Status: 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling/
> Htmlized: 
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01
> Htmlized: 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling
> Diff: 
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01
> 
> Abstract:
> This document defines a method to generate robust TSCH schedules in a
> 6TiSCH (IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4-2015) network, so as
> to protect network nodes against selective jamming attack. Network
> nodes independently compute the new schedule at each slotframe, by
> altering the one originally available from 6top or alternative
> protocols, while preserving a consistent and collision-free
> communication pattern. This method can be added on top of the
> minimal security framework for 6TiSCH.
> 
> 
> 
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> 
> The IETF Secretariat
> 
> 
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