Re: [6tisch] I-D Action: draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-12.txt

Mališa Vučinić <malisa.vucinic@inria.fr> Mon, 29 July 2019 16:09 UTC

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From: Mališa Vučinić <malisa.vucinic@inria.fr>
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Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2019 18:09:17 +0200
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Subject: Re: [6tisch] I-D Action: draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-12.txt
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Dear all,

This is a version of the minimal-security draft that incorporates the resolutions to the two issues discussed during the Montreal meeting: ASN replay attack and the usage of different authentication tag lengths with the same CCM key.

Mališa

> On 29 Jul 2019, at 17:59, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
> 
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
> This draft is a work item of the IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e WG of the IETF.
> 
>        Title           : Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
>        Authors         : Malisa Vucinic
>                          Jonathan Simon
>                          Kris Pister
>                          Michael Richardson
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-12.txt
> 	Pages           : 50
> 	Date            : 2019-07-29
> 
> Abstract:
>   This document describes the minimal framework required for a new
>   device, called "pledge", to securely join a 6TiSCH (IPv6 over the
>   TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e) network.  The framework requires that
>   the pledge and the JRC (join registrar/coordinator, a central
>   entity), share a symmetric key.  How this key is provisioned is out
>   of scope of this document.  Through a single CoAP (Constrained
>   Application Protocol) request-response exchange secured by OSCORE
>   (Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments), the pledge
>   requests admission into the network and the JRC configures it with
>   link-layer keying material and other parameters.  The JRC may at any
>   time update the parameters through another request-response exchange
>   secured by OSCORE.  This specification defines the Constrained Join
>   Protocol and its CBOR (Concise Binary Object Representation) data
>   structures, and configures the rest of the 6TiSCH communication stack
>   for this join process to occur in a secure manner.  Additional
>   security mechanisms may be added on top of this minimal framework.
> 
> 
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security/
> 
> There are also htmlized versions available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-12
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-12
> 
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-12
> 
> 
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> 
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> 
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