Re: [6tisch] draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01 --- rekeying permutation key

Michael Richardson <> Thu, 04 April 2019 14:04 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <>
To: Marco Tiloca <>, Malisa Vucinic <>
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Date: Thu, 04 Apr 2019 10:04:30 -0400
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Subject: Re: [6tisch] draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01 --- rekeying permutation key
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Marco Tiloca <> wrote:
    >> A thought to deal with this is that the new permutation is not used
    >> until the node switches to the new keys.  EXCEPT that the adjacent
    >> nodes will now not be listening at the right time, won't hear traffic
    >> encrypted with the new key, and won't change over themselves.
    >> Authenticated enhanced beacons would perhaps help here.  Maybe I'm
    >> wrong about this problem.

    > <MT> This seems to deserve some more text in the Security
    > Considerations of Section 6.2, such as the following points.

    > The new link keys and permutation keys are expected to be distributed
    > together, just like for the described provisioning through the CoJP
    > Join Response, possibly through the same procedure described in [1].

yes, that's fine, but you have skipped the communications that will occur
*during* the rekey, when some nodes have new keys and some are still using
older keys.

I was looking for some text from 6tisch-minimal that explains how the rekey
actually occurs.

Malisa, it seems like this text has been lost.
Or did we move this process to another document?

The issue Marco is that use of the new key is signaled by receipt of a packet
that uses the new key.  The sending node will have already switched to a new
permuation, while the receiving node will still be on the old schedule.

Michael Richardson <>ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-