Re: [98attendees] Tussle issue in plenary

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Fri, 31 March 2017 14:39 UTC

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To: Bron Gondwana <brong@fastmail.fm>, 98attendees@ietf.org
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [98attendees] Tussle issue in plenary
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On 31/03/17 07:43, Bron Gondwana wrote:
> And the idea of a TLS connection that negotiates in a third party with
> rights to watch or even alter traffic in a standard way sounds better to
> me than an interception box that terminates your connection with their
> own cert that you are required to add to your browser, and then makes an
> additional connection onwards:

Yuk. Been debated and failed. Proposals were made and turned
out crap. We shouldn't go there.

Please check the archives of httpbis, tls and saag for those
recurring discussions before proposing something.

S.