Re: [abfab] UI considerations document
Sam Hartman <hartmans@painless-security.com> Fri, 16 October 2015 13:02 UTC
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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@painless-security.com>
To: Mark Donnelly <mark@painless-security.com>
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Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2015 09:02:33 -0400
In-Reply-To: <5620769F.4020203@painless-security.com> (Mark Donnelly's message
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Subject: Re: [abfab] UI considerations document
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>>>>> "Mark" == Mark Donnelly <mark@painless-security.com> writes: Mark> All: I've spoken with Rhys about the UI considerations Mark> document Mark> (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-abfab-usability-ui-considerations-02), Mark> and I've volunteered to handle the next revision of the draft. Mark> I've collected the comments from the last draft and I'm Mark> working to incorporate them in. Mark> However, I have a few questions for the list. Mark> To start off, Alejandro Perez Mendez wrote that a reference to Mark> Microsoft Cardspace in section 5.1 would be nice. Does anyone Mark> have one? All I can find is a Wikipedia article, which notes Mark> the discontinuation of Cardspace. (Actually, does that Mark> warrant the removal of the inclusion in the doc? I'm not Mark> familiar with Cardspace at all.) I definitely think it is worth mentioning; it was certainly something we were all thinking of. See if you find something starting at https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2006.07.infocard.aspx Mark> Next, Ken Klingenstein asked about whether the user will want Mark> some degree of privacy, or a pseudo-identity. Does the UI Mark> have any visibility or control over this? As I understand the Mark> system, the information that is released about an identity is Mark> decided entirely by the IDP, and communicated to the RP. Correct. The overall protocol supports pseudonyms, but the UI is not currently involved in this decision at all. Mark> Ken also suggests that we add a privacy considerations Mark> section. If the answer to the above question is that the UI Mark> doesn't have any visibility into what attributes the IDP Mark> releases, then I'm not sure what could go in to a privacy Mark> considerations section for the UI document. The privacy Mark> considerations I see would all apply to the greater system, Mark> rather than the client UI. Does anyone have any better Mark> thoughts? So, here are privacy impacts I can think of from the UI. * Automatically choosing an identity can have privacy impact. Think of the Chrome incognito discussion. Whether to let a given application choose a given identity for a given service has privacy impact. * Discussion of the difference between the Kerberos model (use your default credential when you can, giving your KDC information about what services you access even if they don't support Kerberos at all and our model of requesting the user explicitly select an identity when first talking to a service. Note that the impact would be a bit different for ABFAB if we used a default credential. Rather than letting the home IDP know what service you are using, it would let the service know what IDP you were using even if the IDP was inappropriate for that service. Mark> Finally, Ken suggested that the UI drop the concept of an NAI Mark> having a password change URL. Ken argues that the helpdesk Mark> URL that the document already specifies would be less Mark> volatile, and the user could navigate from there. I think Mark> this would remove a usable feature of the system, and if the Mark> password change URL doesn't work then the user could go Mark> through the helpdesk anyway. Any thoughts? I'd assume that if someone doesn't want a password change URI they can not fill it in. Also, this is an informational document. So I tend to agree with you.
- [abfab] UI considerations document Mark Donnelly
- Re: [abfab] UI considerations document Sam Hartman