[abfab] Comments on draft-linus-abfab-ephemeral-keying-00

["Jim Schaad" <[e-mail]>]

Section 2. - I am not sure if you are trying to restrict to the conversation
between the initiator and the acceptor based on the fact that you are
throwing in RADIUS.  There is no RADIUS spoken here.  

 

Section 2.1 - para #2 - The first sentence is just wrong.  No matter what
type of RADIUS you are using, intermediates always have access to the EAP
MSK.  The difference between RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/TLS or RADIUS/DTLS is the
question of how much passive intermediaries are going to be able to see
based on the use of a long term shared secret.

 

Section 2.2 - Passive observers may also be able to fingerprint the client
based on TLS restart information.

 

Section 2.3 - This should include exposing the realm of the user (or the
full user name in bad implementations).

 

You say

   [ maybe expand on how TEAP [draft-ietf-emu-eap-tunnel-method
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tunnel-method> ] could
   solve the problem of AAA proxies learning the MSK, impersonating the
   RP ]

I would be very interested in seeing how you think there could possibly be a
solution in this space.  I can't see one.

 

There probably needs to be a nod to using an application level tunnel as
well.  While I think that it might be nice to have this in the GSS-EAP
layer, we cannot ignore this as an option.

 

Jim