Re: [Ace] Key IDs ... RE: WGLC on draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-02

Ludwig Seitz <ludwig.seitz@ri.se> Tue, 03 July 2018 09:32 UTC

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From: Ludwig Seitz <ludwig.seitz@ri.se>
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Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2018 11:31:49 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Ace] Key IDs ... RE: WGLC on draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-02
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I've finally had the time to think about that Key ID issue for ACE.

Here is what I got:


The case Jim is worried about is the following:

* Client A has key K1 with KID = "A"
* RS also has key K1 with KID = "A"
* Client A has the right to token T1 on RS
* Client B has the right to token T2 on RS


1. Client A gets T1 from AS bound via the cnf claim to KID="A"

2. Client A transfers T1 to RS

3. Client A performs the proof-of-possession with key K1 and gets access 
to RS according to T1

4. Malicious Client B learns of the KID = "A" for T1 (but not of K1).

5. Client B chooses K2 and assigns it KID = "A"

6. Client B gets 2 from AS bound via the cnf claim to KID="A"

7. Client B transfers T2 to RS

8. ?

9. Client B performs the proof-of-possession for K2 and gets access to 
both T1 and T2


Now I'm claiming there is no step 8 that makes step 9 work, unless B can 
get RS to accept a new key (K2) with a duplicate KID.

Thus I'd say, we need to Security Considerations about handling key Ids 
at the recipient of a CWT containing a cnf claim. Something along the 
lines of:

"If a recipient receives a CWT with the a confirmation claim, the 
recipient MUST make sure that keys that may be contained in that claim 
do not have a key identifier that duplicates one of a different key that 
the recipient already recognizes."

Or shorter:

"Recipients MUST make sure that they do not accept identical key 
identifiers for different keys"

/Ludwig

-- 
Ludwig Seitz, PhD
Security Lab, RISE SICS
Phone +46(0)70-349 92 51