Re: [Ace] Shepard comments on draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile

Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> Thu, 31 January 2019 16:46 UTC

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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: 'Francesca Palombini' <francesca.palombini@ericsson.com>, <draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile@ietf.org>
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Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 08:45:48 -0800
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Subject: Re: [Ace] Shepard comments on draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Francesca Palombini <francesca.palombini@ericsson.com>
> Sent: Thursday, January 31, 2019 6:26 AM
> To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>om>; draft-ietf-ace-oscore-
> profile@ietf.org
> Cc: ace@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: Shepard comments on draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile
> 
> Hi Jim,
> 
> Inline.
> 
> Thanks,
> Francesca
> 
> On 31/01/2019, 01:34, "Jim Schaad" <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:
> 
> 
>     1.  Please update the text for MUST/SHOULD/MAY to include the language
> from
>     RFC 8174.
> 
> FP: Right, thanks. Updated now in the github.
> 
>     2.  Section 3.2.1 - What to do is clear if a field is not missing.  What is
>     the correct behavior if a field is present that the client and/or resource
>     server does not recognize.  Is this a fatal error or is it sufficient that
>     they may not behave the same?
> 
> FP: Assuming you are referring to fields missing in the
> OSCORE_Security_Context, (please correct me otherwise) this is a good
> point. We currently do not define what happens if the security context has
> unrecognized parameters. We don't foresee this happening, as the AS
> should know what the client and RS implement. However, to cover this case
> (bad implementation or something went wrong), to be on the safe side, we
> propose that there is a fatal error in that case. In fact, we don't know what
> additional parameters might be registered in the OSCORE_Security_Context,
> and although they could be "risk-free" (as in optional additional information
> non-necessary for the security context derivation), they could also be input
> to the key derivation for example, in which case the endpoint non-
> recognizing them would end up storing a "wrong" security context. What do
> you think?

Sounds good.  I had a vague thought that perhaps some of the group items might be added in the future but no hard items to add.

Jim

> 
>     Jim
> 
> 
>