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Re: [Ace] Offline operation of Resource Server

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Tue, 15 July 2014 15:27 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Rafa Marin Lopez <rafa@um.es>
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Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 11:27:14 -0400
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Cc: Ludwig Seitz <ludwig@sics.se>, ace@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Ace] Offline operation of Resource Server
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Rafa Marin Lopez <rafa@um.es> wrote:
    > That is possible if during the EAP/AAA interactions there is a
    > bootstrapping of some short term credential (e.g. Kerberos
    > tickets). For example, if we talk in Kerberos terminology, the

Please don't build in any assumption in your thinking that the resulting
ticket is short term.  Some may wish it; but for many applications we are
talking about tickets that either never expire, or have expirations times
decades in the future.

Josh Howlett <Josh.Howlett@ja.net> wrote:
    >> So, in summary, there could be an online enrollment and online
    >> authorization decision based on EAP/AAA that allows to bootstrap
    >> "something" that enables RS and C to have an offline interaction during a
    >> period of time (e.g. ticket lifetime).

    > Just by way of example, another "something" that could be bootstrapped
    > by EAP/AAA (as an alternative or complement to a Kerberos ticket) could
    > be a certificate. There is also running code demonstrating this.

Yes; exactly.  The certificate could contain Authorization Attributes rather
than identities.  Anyone who hasn't read rfc2692 and rfc2693 lately, should
do so.

Just think of the kerberos-like symmetric key token as being a certificate
that can only be validated by the originator.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

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