Re: [Ace] Secdir telechat review of draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-41

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Sun, 30 May 2021 23:55 UTC

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Date: Sun, 30 May 2021 16:54:58 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Cc: secdir@ietf.org, ace@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Ace] Secdir telechat review of draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-41
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Thanks, Phill.

I really appreciate having another set of eyes go over the changes in the
draft and cross-referencing against the review comments -- it makes me a
lot more confident that we're in good shape now.

-Ben

On Fri, May 21, 2021 at 04:41:19PM -0700, Phillip Hallam-Baker via Datatracker wrote:
> Reviewer: Phillip Hallam-Baker
> Review result: Ready
> 
> This draft was previously reviewed by Steve Kent for the -27 version. My review
> therefore mostly consists of checking that the changes recommended have been
> made and that no new issues have arisen. Note that contrary to the data in the
> tracker, I was not given the assignment in 2019.
> 
> If you decide that you want to use OAUTH for authorization security for
> Internet of Things, this is a reasonable approach to take. This is not a simple
> proposition or for the fainthearted. OAuth is built around the various
> constraints of the browser world to which the constraints of being a
> constrained device are added.
> 
> The issues raised by Steve have all been addressed as far as I can see. It
> looks good to go but since it is a security spec, ADs should still take note.
> 
>