Re: [Ace] Key IDs ... RE: WGLC on draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-02

[Jim Schaad <[e-mail]>]

No Ben, you are 100% correct.  This is about identifiers and not session
keys.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]>
> Sent: Tuesday, June 26, 2018 5:14 PM
> To: Hannes Tschofenig <[e-mail]>
> Cc: Mike Jones <[e-mail]>; Jim Schaad
> <[e-mail]>; [e-mail];
> [e-mail]
> Subject: Re: [Ace] Key IDs ... RE: WGLC on draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-
> possession-02
> 
> I thought we were worried about collision of key *identifiers*, which were
> not necessarily raw keys or hashes thereof.  But it's possible I was not
paying
> enough attention and got confused.
> 
> -Ben
> 
> On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 03:12:52PM +0000, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> > It does answer my question, Ben.
> >
> > This begs the question why the collision of session keys is suddenly a
> problem in the ACE context when it wasn't a problem so far. Something must
> have changed.
> >
> > Ciao
> > Hannes
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Benjamin Kaduk [mailto:[e-mail]]
> > Sent: 26 June 2018 17:00
> > To: Hannes Tschofenig
> > Cc: Mike Jones; Jim Schaad;
> > [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> > Subject: Re: [Ace] Key IDs ... RE: WGLC on
> > draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-02
> >
> > On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 08:53:57AM +0000, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> > > Ben,
> > >
> > > I was wondering whether the situation is any different in Kerberos. If
the
> KDC creates tickets with a session key included then it needs to make sure
> that it does not create the same symmetric key for different usages.
> > > The key in the Kerberos ticket is similar to the PoP key in our
discussion.
> > >
> > > Are we aware of key collision in Kerberos?
> >
> > I don't believe key collision is an issue in Kerberos.  Long-term keys
> > (which are not what we're talking about here) are identified by a
> > principal name, encryption type, and version number.  Session keys
> > that are contained within tickets (and returned to the client in the
> > KDC-REP) are random, so even if we are only using the birthday bound
> > we're still in pretty good shape.  The modern enctypes tend to use
> > subsession keys generated by the client and/or server as well as the
> > KDC-generated session key, which provides further binding to the current
> session.
> >
> > Does that answer your question?
> >
> > -Ben
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