Re: [Acme] Issuing certificates based on Simple HTTP challenges

[Phillip Hallam-Baker <[e-mail]>]

On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 2:41 PM, Noah Kantrowitz <[e-mail]>
wrote:

>
> > On Dec 15, 2015, at 9:48 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 12:25 PM, Noah Kantrowitz <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
> >
> > > On Dec 15, 2015, at 7:17 AM, Michael Wyraz <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > >
> > > Stephen,
> > >> Yes, I understand that and didn't actually refer to LE at all in my
> mail.
> > > I'm sorry if I missunderstood you with that.
> > >
> > >> Basically, IMO only after we first get a "now" that works
> > > We have a working HTTP-01 spec, implementation and CA. What's missing
> > > for "a 'now' that works"?
> > >
> > >> Personally the optional thing in which I'm much more interested is a
> > >> simple put-challenge-in-DNS one where the CA pays attention to DNSSEC,
> > >> since that's the use-case I have and that would provide some better
> > >> assurance to the certs acquired via acme. I can see that there might
> > >> also be value for some (other) folks in SRV if it means no need to
> > >> dynamically change DNS. But, if someone is saying "we must all do
> > >> these more complex things for security reasons" then they are, in this
> > >> context, wrong. And my mail was reacting to just such a statement.
> > > Why not just placing a static public key to DNS that is allowed to sign
> > > ACME requests for this domain? Simple, no need for dynamic updates
> (yes,
> > > it's standardized for years but AFAIK not seen very often in real world
> > > scenarios).
> >
> > Anything that makes deployment _harder_ than the current LE client is a
> move in the wrong direction. UX matters, with security more than just about
> anything else. Unless you can propose a user flow to go with this change,
> no amount of hypothetical correctness is worth having a tool no one will
> use.
> >
> > Harder for whom?
> >
> > The current scheme isn't going to work for any geolocation based systems
> and is a terrible fit for enterprise.
>
> I think this is a bit of a red herring on a few fronts. You can use
> http-01 or similar strategies on a widely-replicated system, it is just
> annoying because you need to push the challenge response file to a bunch of
> places. If the geo-distributed piece is a CDN, the system is already
> designed to smash caches effectively so that is handled. Still, that is
> gross and a lot of work, but fortunately there is already a DNS challenge
> in the works that will help for some cases.
>

And is likely to be challenged by the IPR holder.

Keys in the DNS has prior art. It is also rather simpler to implement.