Re: [Acme] various issues with the spec

As a meta point, this discussion is incomprehensible. The objective is to
produce a comprehensible spec.

We should agree terms of art for the actors, certs etc. and use them
consistently.

On Sun, Jun 14, 2015 at 3:01 AM, Fraser Tweedale <frase@frase.id.au> wrote:

> On Sun, Jun 14, 2015 at 08:06:46AM +0200, Stefan Bühler wrote:
> > On Sun, 14 Jun 2015 11:17:38 +1000
> > Fraser Tweedale <frase@frase.id.au> wrote:
> >
> > > On Sun, Jun 14, 2015 at 12:24:32AM +0200, Stefan Bühler wrote:
> > > > * dvsni: Please don't require the domain name which is being
> > > > validated to be part of subjectAltName; configuring such
> > > > certificate might break a working setup in production, when it
> > > > "wins" over an already present and valid certificate for the domain.
> > > >
> > > No, this certificate is only presented for the host
> > > `<nonce>.acme.invalid'.
> >
> > You are thinking of a setup where you configure explicitly which
> > certificate is used for which SNI value. But gnutls for example has a
> > nice feature where you can just give it all your certificates, and it
> > will pick the matching one automatically.
> >
> Do you propose that the certificate *not* bear the domain name being
> validated in *either* the Subject DN or subjectAltName extension?
>
> This probably does not affect the protocol, but I think is nice to
> include it anyway for the sake of being explicit.  Can you identify
> any existing server software which would is incompatible with ACME
> dvsni due to the validation certificate bearing the name being
> validated?
>
> > > > * dvsni: `The public key is the public key for the key pair being
> > > >   authorized`. I hope this was just an accident, this would be
> > > > *really* wrong to require.
> > > >
> > > Why would this be wrong?  Remember that this certificate is
> > > generated as part of, and intented for use only as part of the
> > > authorization workflow.  It has no bearing on certificates
> > > eventually issued for the domain name being authorized.
> >
> > I don't want my webserver to see my account private key, ever. Am I
> > really the first guy to have a problem with that?
> >
> > > > * dvsni: Don't require it to be a self-signed certificate - what
> > > > does it matter who signed it?
> > > >
> > > It must be signed by the account key as evidence that the entity
> > > performing the authorization controls the account key.
> >
> > What exactly is the attack scenario here if this is not checked?
> > Person A playing MITM to give control over domain B to account C, and
> > account C started the authorization but didn't actually want it to
> > succeed?
> >
> > If you really require such evidence, perhaps it could be required to
> > have the certificate signed by the account key instead of being
> > self-signed.
> >
> > regards,
> > Stefan
>
> You've convinced me on these latter points - the certificate should
> be signed by the account key but the key could be a different key
> (i.e. not a self-signed cert) - and this means that the web server
> need not have access to the account private key.
>
> Cheers,
> Fraser
>
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