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Re: [Acme] Add badPublicKey error

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Thu, 24 January 2019 15:52 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Rob Stradling <rob@sectigo.com>, IETF ACME <acme@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Acme] Add badPublicKey error
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Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:51:11 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Acme] Add badPublicKey error
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As WG co-chair, I am not thrilled with making this addition so very very late in the process.  If the WG wants to do it, we'd need (a) clear consensus and (b) a quick approval from the IESG.

As an individual, I dislike putting "here's what's wrong with your key" in the error message. For example, it encourages a thief to do "venue shopping" looking for a CA that will certify their stolen keypair.

On 1/24/19, 9:27 AM, "Rob Stradling" <rob@sectigo.com> wrote:

    I realize it's very late for making non-editorial changes to 
    draft-ietf-acme-acme, but I'd like to propose adding a new badPublicKey 
    error.  This error would be returned by the server whenever it does not 
    support, or wishes to reject, a "jwk" public key supplied in a client's 
    request.
    
    Proposed text: https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/acme/pull/478
    
    The 'array of supported "alg" values' in a badSignatureAlgorithm 
    response is useful, but ISTM that it doesn't provide detailed enough 
    information to assist a client in generating a suitable public key.
    
    (If the consensus is that it's too late to add a new error type, then my 
    alternative proposal will be to use "malformed" instead of adding 
    "badPublicKey", but keep the rest of PR 478 as is; I think it's a good 
    idea to call out the need for a server to sanity check each 
    client-supplied public key).
    
    -- 
    Rob Stradling
    Senior Research & Development Scientist
    Sectigo Limited
    
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