Re: [Acme] Signature misuse vulnerability in draft-barnes-acme-04

Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> Thu, 13 August 2015 15:01 UTC

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Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2015 08:01:07 -0700
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>
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Cc: "acme@ietf.org" <acme@ietf.org>, yan <yan@eff.org>, Andrew Ayer <agwa@andrewayer.name>
Subject: Re: [Acme] Signature misuse vulnerability in draft-barnes-acme-04
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On Thu, Aug 13, 2015 at 2:40 AM, Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>; wrote:
> On 13/08/15 02:58, yan wrote:
> <snip>
>>
>> I see James is already fixing this:
>> https://github.com/letsencrypt/acme-spec/pull/217/files.
>
>
> Shouldn't that work be happening at...
>
> https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/acme
>
> ...now?

Yes, thanks for pointing that out.  I have closed that PR.

To be clear: The "letsencrypt/acme-spec" repo is still open for the
moment, but at this point, the only changes being accepted are minor
clarifications or critical fixes.  (Once Let's Encrypt gets stable, I
expect that repo to close down and any deltas against -04 to be
proposed against the IETF document.)  Since there's an
implementation-side fix for this issue (using the proper account key),
this is not a critical fix.

Anything novel needs to be discussed on this list and done in the IETF
repo, as you note.

--Richard


>
> --
> Rob Stradling
> Senior Research & Development Scientist
> COMODO - Creating Trust Online
>