Re: [Acme] tls-sni-01 validation compromise

[Martin Thomson <[e-mail]>]

On 22 January 2016 at 13:38, Jehiah Czebotar <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 1) Change the requirement that the self signed cert have one DNSName,
> and require the response to have TWO DNS names. One that matches the
> requested hostname, and a second that is secret which proves it can
> only be created by the appropriate party initiating validation
> 2) Remove reliance on SNI matching, and make the challenge `tls-01`
> and fulfill the same HTTP response requirements as `http-01` where the
> Hostname, and request path are untrusted, but the response body with
> full keyAuthorization proves the connection to the requestor. This
> opens up the possibility of TLS validation against the $domain being
> validated instead of relying on a .acme.invalid hostname.

I think that the suggestion that the challenge response include
something unique to the challenge (as http-01 already does) is a fine
suggestion.  I don't think that it matters much how that is done.  If
the intent is to verify that the requester exercises control over the
TLS server, having this restricted to things that are part of the TLS
server configuration is probably advisable.

To that end, adding a key authorization to the certificate would seem
to be the best option.  Whether that is done as a second
subjectAltName or as a separate extension probably doesn't matter
much.

Following through with a challenge like http-01 would work, but it
means playing with the configuration of the server in two places.