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Re: [Acme] High level comments on draft-barnes-acme (the GitHub version)

Jacob Hoffman-Andrews <jsha@eff.org> Wed, 25 March 2015 22:21 UTC

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Cc: Jonathan Rudenberg <jonathan@titanous.com>, "acme@ietf.org" <acme@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Acme] High level comments on draft-barnes-acme (the GitHub version)
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> This seems like a big deal, no? That is, since SNI is one of the few
things not protected in the TLS handshake, it does seem spoofable. If
there's not something I'm missing, it seems like the proposal should
just drop DVSNI altogether.

An attacker who fully controls the network is explicitly not part of the
threat model for any Domain Validation. None of the available techniques
for DV, whether they involve fetching a file, sending an email, or doing
a TLS handshake can fully mitigate a network attacker.

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