[Acme] Adam Roach's Yes on draft-ietf-acme-star-09: (with COMMENT)

Adam Roach via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Wed, 02 October 2019 01:22 UTC

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Subject: [Acme] Adam Roach's Yes on draft-ietf-acme-star-09: (with COMMENT)
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Adam Roach has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-acme-star-09: Yes

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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thanks for the work that everyone put into this document! I have
a small number of very minor editorial nits.

[Sorry for the earlier DISCUSS; I had mixed up the cert issuance
model in my head again].

§3.3:

>  The Server SHOULD include the "Cert-Not-Before" and "Cert-Not-After"
>  HTTP headers in the response.

Nit: "...HTTP header fields..."

>  Following are further clarifications regarding usage of these
>  headers, as per [RFC7231] Sec. 8.3.1.  All apply to both headers.

Nit: "...header fields..."

>
>  o  This header is a single value, not a list.

Nit: "...header field..."

>  o  The header is used only in responses to GET, HEAD and POST-as-GET

Nit: "...header field..."

>     requests, and only for MIME types that denote public key
>     certificates.
>  o  Header semantics are independent of context.

Nit: "Header field..."

>  o  The header is not hop-by-hop.

Nit: "...header field..."

>  o  Intermediaries MAY insert or delete the value, but MUST ensure
>     that if present, the header value equals the corresponding value

Nit: "...header field..."

>     within the credential.
>  o  The header is not appropriate for a Vary field.

Nit: "...header field..."

>  o  The header is allowed within message trailers.

Nit: "...header field..."

>  o  The header is not appropriate within redirects.

Nit: "...header field..."

>  o  The header does not introduce additional security considerations.

Nit: "...header field..."

>     It discloses in a simpler form information that is already
>     available inside the credential.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

§3.3:

>  o  Intermediaries MAY insert or delete the value, but MUST ensure
>     that if present, the header value equals the corresponding value
>     within the credential.

This probably isn't what you want to say. Read literally, this imposes
a requirements on intermediaries who are neither removing nor adding
these header fields to validate that they match the value in the certs.
That's clearly an unrealistic expectation. I suspect the intention here
is that any entity who inserts a value must ensure that the newly inserted
value matches the corresponding value in the certificate.