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[Acme] Re: Interactions between HTTPS RRs (rfc9460) and HTTP-01 DV

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Tue, 15 April 2025 22:10 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org>, IETF ACME <acme@ietf.org>
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Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2025 18:10:25 -0400
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Subject: [Acme] Re: Interactions between HTTPS RRs (rfc9460) and HTTP-01 DV
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Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org> wrote:
    > One of my colleagues recently pointed out a potential interaction between
    > HTTPS RRs (RFC 9460) as it relates to ACME and HTTP-01 DV.  If a hostname
    > get an HTTPS RR into DNS prior to getting a cert validated, then there
    > would be a problem if the ACME client resolved the HTTPS RR and
    > auto-upgraded the http:// URI to https as part of HTTP-01 DV.  Since a cert
    > won't exist yet this would fail.

That seems like a bad thing for an ACME server to do.
It's an http-01 challenge, not an https-01 challenge.
It shouldn't be updating.  ACME servers doing dns-01 challenges already take
special care to avoid caching, so they should also pay attention to ignore
HTTPS RRs

    > How would we want to clarify this?  It's probably too big for an errata for
    > RFC 8555 but annoying to have to have a draft just to clarify all on its
    > own.  If there are plans to do an rfc8555bis (or anything else Updating
    > rfc8555 for HTTP-01) this could be good to include in there.

    > The reading of RFC 8555 section 8.3 is fairly clear that:

    > Dereference the URL using an HTTP GET request. This request MUST be sent to
    > TCP port 80 on the HTTP server

I don't think it's too big for an errata.
"When doing http-01 challenges, ignore HTTPS RRs"

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide

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