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Re: [Acme] On multiple CAs and contact-based recovery

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Thu, 24 March 2016 05:45 UTC

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Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2016 16:45:06 +1100
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Karthik Bhargavan <karthikeyan.bhargavan@inria.fr>
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Subject: Re: [Acme] On multiple CAs and contact-based recovery
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On 24 March 2016 at 09:33, Karthik Bhargavan
<karthikeyan.bhargavan@inria.fr> wrote:
> Emails with clickable links are *BAD*; we should enhance their security by
> linking them better with
> the ACME account key.


FWIW, I think that a clickable link could be possible, it just
wouldn't be able to point to the server.  If, as you suggest, the
point is to give the ACME client a fresh secret, then the link could
be changed from:

https://acme.server.example/recover/<secret>

to

acme:recover:<secret>

Most operating systems understand how to invoke local software in
response to that and your proposed flow behaves much the same from a
user perspective.

That isn't *as* good as your proposal, I don't think, but it might
have some usability advantages.

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