Re: [Acme] AD review of draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-05

[Roman Danyliw <[e-mail]>]

Hi!

I wanted to check-in with the WG on the next steps for draft-ietf-acme-authority-token.  I performed an AD review on it in October-2020 (~7 months) and haven't heard back.  Rich and I asked again in January 2021 and April 2021 but got no response.  Is this document something the WG still wants to advance?

Regards,
Roman


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Acme <[e-mail]> On Behalf Of Roman Danyliw
> Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2021 4:01 PM
> To: Salz, Rich <[e-mail]>; Chris Wendt <[e-mail]>;
> Mary Barnes <[e-mail]>; Peterson, Jon
> <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
> Cc: [e-mail]
> Subject: Re: [Acme] AD review of draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-05
> 
> Hi!
> 
> I'm checking in on status of this document.  I'd like to batch it with draft-ietf-
> acme-authority-token-tnauthlist when they go to the IESG.
> 
> Thanks,
> Roman
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Salz, Rich <[e-mail]>
> > Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 3:16 PM
> > To: Roman Danyliw <[e-mail]>; Chris Wendt
> > <[e-mail]>; Mary Barnes <[e-mail]>;
> > Peterson, Jon <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
> > Cc: [e-mail]
> > Subject: Re: [Acme] AD review of draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-05
> >
> > Authors,
> >
> > Have these been addressed?  Soon?
> >
> > On 10/14/20, 1:00 PM, "Roman Danyliw" <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >
> >     Hi!
> >
> >     I performed an AD review of draft-ietf-acme-authority-token.
> > Thanks for writing this document in an extensible way (for additional
> > token types).  Below is my detailed feedback.
> >
> >     ** What is the intended status of this document? The document says
> > Informational; the datatracker and the shepherd's report says Proposed
> > Standard.  TnAuthlist is PS.  These four places need to be consistent.
> >
> >     ** Are there implementations of this document?  The rough history
> > in ACME seems to have been PS should have implementation experience.
> > Is the link to STIR decisive here (to make it PS)?
> >
> >     ** ID-Nits reported the following issues with references being
> > listed but not
> > used:
> >       == Unused Reference: 'I-D.ietf-acme-service-provider' is defined on line
> >          455, but no explicit reference was found in the text
> >
> >       == Unused Reference: 'I-D.ietf-acme-star' is defined on line 460, but no
> >          explicit reference was found in the text
> >
> >       == Unused Reference: 'RFC7340' is defined on line 477, but no explicit
> >          reference was found in the text
> >
> >       == Unused Reference: 'RFC8224' is defined on line 494, but no explicit
> >          reference was found in the text
> >
> >       == Unused Reference: 'RFC8225' is defined on line 500, but no explicit
> >          reference was found in the text
> >
> >     ** Additionally, on the topic of references, why are
> > [I-D.ietf-acme-authority- token-tnauthlist] , [RFC7340] and [RFC8226]
> normative?
> >
> >     -- Section 1. [I-D.ietf-acme-telephone] is an expired draft that
> > doesn't appear to be actively advanced.  Given that it primarily to
> > show an example use case, it should likely be an informative, not normative,
> reference.
> >
> >     ** In the introductory materials (abstract and/or Section 1), I
> > would have benefited from an upfront statement that this document is
> > describing an architecture for Authority Tokens, a particular token
> > format, a new protocol for retrieving the token, and integration of
> > this token into an ACME challenge.  In particular the existence of the
> > new protocol (between the TA and the client) was not clear.
> >
> >     ** The tkauth-type="atc" type doesn't seem to describe all of the
> > required information described by Section 3.1 - 3.3 and Section 9
> > (Security
> > Considerations) as being needed for a token format.  Specifically:
> >
> >     (a) Section 3.1.  Per "Definitions of a tkauth-type MUST specify
> > how they manage the freshness of authority assignments", how is
> > freshness of authority assignment handled in tkauth-type="atc"?
> >
> >     (b)  Section 3.2 suggests that tokens need to convey scope.  This
> > scope seems to be identifier specific conveyed through the tkvalue.
> > However, the values of tkvalue is out of scope of this document.
> >
> >     (c) Section 3.3. suggests "To mitigate this, Authority Tokens
> > contain a binding signed by an Authority".  Section 9 says "... all
> > Authority Tokens MUST contain a field that identifies to the CA which
> > ACME client requested the token from the authority; here that is the
> > fingerprint specified in Section 4)."  However, Section
> > 4 says, "For the purposes of the "atc" tkauth-type, the binding
> > "fingerprint" is assumed to be a fingerprint of the ACME credential
> > for the account used to request the certificate, but the specification
> > of how the binding is generated is left to the identifier type profile
> > for the Authority Token."  This seems to suggest that defining the binding
> computation is out scope of this document.
> >
> >     For the binding, I'm curious on how is it computed (on what input?
> > How are algorithms/keys selected) and when does this need to occur?
> >
> >     Minimally, it seems that properties (b) and (c) can only be
> > satisfied with the combination of this document and a particular
> > "identifier profile".  Perhaps this section is spelling out
> > requirements for both of those collectively?  If so, this should be
> > explicitly stated (perhaps in the intro to Section 3, reminded in Sections 4 and
> 9).
> >
> >     ** Editorially, decide on where the text will use AT and TA;
> > Authority Token and Token Authority; or token and authority.  It would
> > be clear if it was the fewest possible version of this key terms.
> >
> >     ** Section 3.  Editorial.  The title "Challenges for an Authority
> > Token" might be clearer if reworded given that ACME has "challenges" -
> > perhaps s/Challenges for an Authority Token/ACME Authority Token
> > Challenge/
> >
> >     ** Section 3.  The text notes that authority tokens can be used
> > for ACME challenges, but this document doesn't add a new challenge
> > type to the "ACME Validation Methods" registry.  Section 6 provides an
> > example using token- tnauthlist which seems to suggest a
> > type="tkauth-01", but that isn't specified in draft-ietf-acme-token-tnauthlist
> or this document.
> >
> >     I also found it jarring to jump into the discussion of tkauth-type
> > and token authority without a bit more context.  I recommend replacing
> > the last paragraph as follows:
> >
> >     OLD
> >     ACME challenges that support Authority Tokens ...
> >
> >     NEW
> >
> >     The ACME Authority Token Challenge, "tkauth-01", supports
> > different token types.  The token type is determined by a new ACME
> > challenge field, tkauth- type.  An IANA registry is used to manage the
> > values of tkauth-type, see Section 8.*.  Additionally, this challenge
> > also has a new "token-authority" field to designate a location where a token
> can be acquired.
> >
> >     ** Section 3.1. Per "The IANA will maintain a registry of
> > tkauth-types under a policy of Specification Required", move this text
> > about registry policy to the IANA section
> >
> >     ** Section 3.1.  Per "... future specifications must indicate how
> > a token conveys to the CA the name(s) ...", is there a reason this
> > isn't a normative MUST?
> >
> >     ** Section 3.1.  Per "The protocols used to request an Authority
> > Token MUST convey to the Token Authority the identifier type and value
> > from the ACME challenge ...", the language of "from the ACEM
> > challenge" suggests only a workflow where the token is requested after
> > engagement with the ACME server.  However, Section 3.2 suggests that a
> > client might get the token before engaging the ACME server.  Maybe
> > s/from the ACME challenge/from or what will be used in the ACME
> > challenge/
> >
> >     ** Section 3.2.  Editorial. Somewhere earlier in the text state
> > "Authority Token (AT)", as no text currently establishes this acronym.
> >
> >     ** Section 3.2.  Editorial. Consistently use "Authority Token",
> > s/to a client a Token/to a client an Authority Token/
> >
> >     ** Section 3.2.  Per "an Authority Token could attest to all of
> > the resources that the client is eligible to receive certificates
> > for", couldn't this leaks information to a CA, if that single CA is not
> responsible for all of the scopes?
> >
> >     ** Section 3.2. Editorial. Consistently use "Token Authority"
> > instead of "Authority" to make it clear were aren't saying "Certificate
> Authority"
> >
> >     ** Section 3.3.  Editorial. I found it confusing to use "binding"
> > and both a noun and a verb:
> >     -- "To mitigate this, Authority Tokens contain a binding signed by
> > an Authority ..."
> >     -- "Binding an Authority Token to a particular ACME account ..."
> >
> >     ** Section 4.  Editorial.
> >
> >     OLD
> >     This draft registers a tkauth-type of "atc", for the Authority Token
> >        Challenge.   Here the "atc" tkauth-type signifies a standard JWT token
> >        [RFC7519] using a JWS-defined signature string [RFC7515]. This may
> >        be used for any number of different identifier types given in ACME
> >        challenges.  The "atc" element (defined below) lists the identifier
> >        type used by tokens based on ATC .  The use of "atc" is restricted to
> >        JWTs, if non-JWT tokens were desired for ACME challenges, a different
> >        tkauth-type should be defined for them.
> >
> >     NEW
> >     This draft specifies a tkauth-type of "atc" which is a standard
> > JWT token [RFC7519] using a JWS-defined signature string [RFC7115].
> > The "atc" tkauth- type MAY be used for any number of different ACME
> > identifier types in the ACME challenge.  A new JWT claim, "atc", is
> > defined below and lists the identifier type used in this Authority
> > Token.  The "atc" tkauth-type is restricted to the JWTs; if a non-JWT
> > token format is desired for the ACME Authority Token Challenge, a
> > different tkauth-type should be specified and registered in the "xxx"
> > registry defined in Section 8.*
> >
> >     ** Section 4.  Editorial. ATC is used but never explicitly defined
> > as being "Authority Token Challenge (ATC)".
> >
> >     ** Section 4.  What would be the circumstance where the x5u/iss
> > would not equal the token-authority?
> >
> >     ** Section 4.  Why is "The JWT payload must also contain a ...",
> > not a normative MUST?
> >
> >     ** Section 4.  Should the values of tktype be constrained to the
> > IANA "ACME Identifier Types" registry?
> >
> >     ** Section 4.  This text should explicitly say that "tkvalue"
> > semantics are outside the scope of this document.
> >
> >     ** Section 4. s/"atc" element/"atc" claim/
> >
> >     ** Section 4.  The example in this section is missing the full
> > payload/protected /signature structure to show the actual binding
> > provided by the server
> >
> >     ** Section 5.  This token acquisition protocol seems underspecified:
> >     -- How does the client authenticate/do authorization with the HTTPS
> server?
> >
> >     -- Is there any semantics to the resource locator to make for an
> > interoperable/discoverable URI?
> >
> >     -- Does the client get to request a scope?
> >
> >     ** Section 5. Editorial. s/a Authority Token/an Authority Token/
> >
> >     ** Section 5.1.  It might be useful to show a full server response
> > example given a particular client request
> >
> >     ** Section 5.1
> >     After an HTTPS-level challenge to verify the identity of the client
> >        and subsequently making an authorization decision , in the success
> >        case the Token Authority returns a 200 OK with a body of type
> >        "application/json"  containing the Authority Token.
> >
> >     -- What is an "HTTPS-level challenge"?
> >
> >     -- It seems like a few words are missing describing the server's
> > behavior to describe what happens between client sending the JSON
> > "atc" blob and returning an authority token?  Should there be text
> > about signing? The server validating the scope in a some identifier specific
> way?
> >
> >     -- How is error handling managed with the HTTP error code?  The
> > TnAuthlist draft actually specifies this behavior more that this base
> document.
> >
> >     -- Section 5.  Shouldn't a successful response from a Token
> > Authority return a body of type "application/jwt" if an "authority
> > token" is being returned per Section 4?
> >
> >     ** Section 6.  This section seems underspecified with only the use
> > of an example.  It provides no normative text on using the authority
> > token in the ACME challenge.  For example, what type should be used
> > (tkauth-01)?  What is the cardinality of tk-auth-type, token-authority, token?
> >
> >     ** Section 8.  This text registers "atc" as an ACME identifier.
> > When and how is that used?  I thought that identifier profiles
> > specified an identifier and that the atc what the challenge/verification type.
> >
> >     ** Section 8.  Is there a reason that the "atc" claim from Section
> > 4 not being registered in the "JSON Web Token Claims" registry?
> >
> >     ** Section 8.  Per the registry of "token types", there don't seem
> > to be enough details here:
> >     -- Is the intent for the registry to be called (in lower case) "token types".
> > Shouldn't it be something like "ACME Authority Token Challenge Types"?
> >
> >     -- What columns are in that registry?  Please be explicit, if it
> > is Label and Reference.
> >
> >     Regards,
> >     Roman
> >
> >     _______________________________________________
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