[Acme] Re: Questions on ACME Protocol: Wildcard Certificate Distribution & Certificate Pinning for Mobile Apps

Aaron Gable <aaron@letsencrypt.org> Fri, 10 April 2026 18:51 UTC

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From: Aaron Gable <aaron@letsencrypt.org>
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 11:51:06 -0700
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To: Marin Mihajlović <Marin.Mihajlovic@asee.io>
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Subject: [Acme] Re: Questions on ACME Protocol: Wildcard Certificate Distribution & Certificate Pinning for Mobile Apps
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I'll provide a slightly different set of answers to these questions:

On Fri, Apr 10, 2026 at 4:25 AM Marin Mihajlović <Marin.Mihajlovic@asee.io>
wrote:

>
> 1. Wildcard Certificate Distribution Across Multiple Servers
>

No, the ACME WG does not have suggestions for how to distribute information
(both secret key material and non-secret certificates) across your
infrastructure. The purpose of the IETF is to standardize protocols so that
*non*-cooperating entities may agree on how to interoperate. Your
infrastructure is presumably all developed and controlled by the same
entity, so synchronization of secrets across that infrastructure does not
require publicly-standardized protocols.

There are many commercial solutions for provisioning secrets across a
fleet. I suspect that whatever mechanism you are already using to
coordinate deployments of web servers (e.g. kubernetes or nomad) has an
associated mechanism for solving this problem (e.g. hashicorp vault).


> 2. Certificate Pinning in Mobile Applications
>

Do not pin end-entity certificates in mobile applications. Even if you have
mechanisms in place to update the pin during a normal renewal/replacement
cycle, that mechanism will not work if the CA is every forced to revoke
your cert. A CA mass revocation event will result in extensive downtime for
your application, until you're able to release (and get everyone to update
to!) a new version.

I also recommend against pinning end-entity public keys in mobile
applications, because the best practice is to rotate your keypair every
time you renew your certificate.

I instead recommend that you re-examine the security considerations that
have led you to decide to pin, and consider whether that conclusion is
correct. Pinning does little to protect against impersonation in the
WebPKI, and causes much harm for the little protection it provides. If you
decide that you truly do require pinning, then I would instead suggest
operating your own private CA and having your mobile application pin a
certificate issued from that, free from the certificate lifetime and
revocation requirements of a larger PKI.

Aaron