Re: [Acme] Proposed changes to TLS-SNI, autorenewal removal

Andrew Ayer <> Fri, 22 January 2016 18:27 UTC

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Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 10:27:25 -0800
From: Andrew Ayer <>
To: Hugo Landau <>
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Subject: Re: [Acme] Proposed changes to TLS-SNI, autorenewal removal
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On Fri, 22 Jan 2016 16:13:07 +0000
Hugo Landau <> wrote:

> Firstly, I've drafted a specification for tls-sni-02
> which resolves Jehiah's concerns.
>   <>

I agree with jehiah's comment on GitHub that for consistency with the
http-01 challenge, SAN A (the token) should be used for the SNI
request, and SAN B (the keyAuthorization) should be the SAN which the
ACME server looks for.

Also, it's not necessary for the ACME server to verify that the
returned certificate contains SAN A (the token).  Seeing the
keyAuthorization in a SAN is sufficient.

I think these changes should be made because paring the challenges down
to their essentials and making them as similar as possible makes them
much easier to reason about.  For both http-01 and tls-sni-02, the
basic procedure would be:

1. Request a resource (file or certificate) at the domain using the
token to identify the resource.

2. Verify that the returned resource contains the keyAuthorization.

-- Andrew