[acvp] ACVP draft comments
Yaron Sheffer <email@example.com> Thu, 28 March 2019 10:17 UTC
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From: Yaron Sheffer <email@example.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2019 11:17:39 +0100
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Subject: [acvp] ACVP draft comments
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I reviewed the spec in some depth, but only skimmed the other major document. So here are a few comments. Thank you for this important work!
* FCS: expand the acronym: in the Terminology section?* Why support HTTP (as opposed to HTTPS) at all? IMO TLS should be REQUIRED, not RECOMMENDED.
* What is the difference between validation testing and crypto assessment testing?
* The notion of "verifiable artifacts" is not well defined here or possibly even bogus (any crypto module can be subverted to produce fake results), so I wouldn't use it.
* Authentication should actually be in scope, at least to enable a minimum interoperable implementation.
* "Mutual authentication", you probably mean TLS with mutual certificate-based auth, please clarify.
* DRBG: expand.
* Figure 1: I would think the DUT is only the crypto module, and does not include the ACV client which is not actually being tested.
* 4.1: please clarify the notion of real-time vs. non-real time operation. It's not clear to me where real-time testing can be useful. (This is explained later, so maybe add a forward reference to the Terminology).
* I am sure you're already used to it, but first-timers will be highly confused by the sense of request+response which is opposite the usual: server to client. Can we rename them?
* 5.1, please use an example.com URI (RFC 6761).
* 5.1, version numbers are later included in the URI, but not here. Why?
* 6.1, as noted above, IMO a single baseline authentication method should be mandated, though implementations may choose to add others.
* 7: the word "extensions" should be quoted. Better yet, give an example. It is also very common to have an IANA registry for extensions names, in order to avoid conflicts, and/or to give a naming convention such as using a DNS name of the organization (similar to Java packages).
* 8: this is not well-specified. What if a new port is NOT required? Also, what is the syntax for the secondary port? How is it authenticated? And in fact, why is it ever needed, i.e. why would a server agree to accept on an auxiliary port what it refuses to accept on the main port?
* 9. This section mentions "major/minor" but the examples all have "v1". In general this section needs a lot more clarity.
* 10. Maybe start the section with a quick overview of the message exchanges.
* 10.1. Primary contact? I'm not sure it is useful to configure people's names on the servers.
* 10.2. It is implied that you cannot have multiple outstanding requests in parallel for the same client. I suggest to make it explicit.
* 10.3. Alg:none should never be used in production, and also, never in a standard.
* 10.3. "Key agreement would follow RFC7518." I'm not sure what you mean. I suspect you want to say, Keys are pre-provisioned to the client and server according to RFC 7518.
* 10.3. More work is needed on the JWT: you want integrity protection, not encryption. Unless you're passing the database key, in which case you do need encryption. HS256 is obviously only integrity protection. Also, you'd want a public key (RS256) rather than a shared HMAC key, for better security.
* 10.3.2. Why use the expired token in the exchange? This means the server should have a special case where it accepts expired tokens - not very good.
* 10.5. Please avoid Markdown "bold", it doesn't render correctly in the text version.
* 10.5. We should discuss the use of JSON Schema (https://json-schema.org/" rel="nofollow">https://json-schema.org/) to avoid lengthy an ill-defined examples.
* Are you sure you want the complexity of PUT, with per-property updates? This breaks once you have arrays. For example, you cannot add or remove a single phone numbers, you have to specify them all.
* Having the DELETE methods as "optional" makes it very hard to test this API. I would suggest to have them as mandatory, but *allow* servers to refuse them based on policy (and then return an error code).
* 10.8.3. Dependency properties seem to introduce too much complexity. I would assume they can be hardcoded or maybe specified here, but not available for listing/parsing at run-time.
* Algorithms: in many cases you have a cross-product of name X key-length X mode. Maybe for these cases you want an array of available key-lengths and an array of available modes, provided all combinations are supported.
* What does "encrypt at rest" mean, and why is it a parameter at all?
* When listing sessions, I would expect a status field: not-started, in-progress, complete-passed, complete-failed.
* Why is there a per-session access token, why not reuse the on-going login based access token?
* "Expiry" field, please use standard ISO8601 time, as usual. Besides, the current format lacks a time zone.
* 13. Returned errors: please use RFC 7807 rather than creating a new format.
* IANA section: better incorporate it into the main document.
* draft-celi-block-ciph: is there any support for negative testing, specifically cases where AES-GCM decryption should fail because the auth tag is incorrect?