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Re: [Add] fixing coffee shop brokenness with DoH

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Wed, 24 July 2019 15:12 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 08:11:14 -0700
Message-ID: <CABcZeBPB2Bb8RCigDt+tJ5Lz3KQQnPAVVkrF+fDUiTFJcw=eVw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
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Subject: Re: [Add] fixing coffee shop brokenness with DoH
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On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 8:03 AM Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:

>
>
> > On 24 Jul 2019, at 11:40, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> >
> > DNSSEC does not address two security issues that we are concerned with:
> >
> > - Surveillance by actors on the user's network (including, perhaps, the
> recursive resolver)
> > - Blocking by the recursive resolver.
>
> DNSSEC *does* deal with recursive resolver blocking - provided the blocked
> name is signed*. If the recursive resolver returns a lie -- fake RRs or an
> NXDOMAIN -- a validating client can detect that and act accordingly.
>

See my response to Ted. From the perspective of the client, acting
accordingly looks basically identical to how you behave with a valid
NXDOMAIN, and so DNSSEC doesn't change the situation very much.

-Ekr


> * Sadly, far too many zones are not signed yet - including yours and mine.
>
>

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