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Re: [Add] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-mglt-abcd-doh-privacy-analysis-00.txt

Alec Muffett <alec.muffett@gmail.com> Tue, 05 November 2019 22:39 UTC

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From: Alec Muffett <alec.muffett@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 05 Nov 2019 22:38:33 +0000
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To: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-mglt-abcd-doh-privacy-analysis-00.txt
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On Tue, 5 Nov 2019 at 21:34, Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> wrote:

> One aspect I've found common to criticisms of DoT and DoH is that they
> tend to focus on "privacy", which I take to mean confidentiality.. It's
> true that these encrypted transports might not provide confidentiality,
> since the information in the query can currently leak in several ways.
>
> However, DoT and DoH do provide message integrity between the client and
> the selected resolver. It's difficult to argue that this property is a bad
> thing.
>

This; it's a curious blind spot, similar to the perennial "Why would
{Facebook*, NYTimes, BBC} run a Tor Onion site?" question.

Answer: security models contain more than {anonymity, privacy} and (in the
latter case) Tor Onion Networking offers benefits like integrity and
assurance of to whom you are connected.

Assurances which DoH also affords over Do53, specifically.

    -a

* https://www.wired.com/2014/10/facebook-tor-dark-site/

-- 
>
http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/aboutalecm

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