Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: Malware adopting DoH

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Thu, 12 September 2019 16:03 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2019 12:03:15 -0400
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To: "Dixon, Hugh" <Hugh.Dixon=40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: Malware adopting DoH
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A question you might ask is, “how do we know that this malware is using DoH?”  Also, now that it is doing DoH, what new opportunities exist for stopping it?  Is it easier or harder to trick it?

It’s all very well and good to point out that it’s using DoH and that this blocks certain mitigation strategies, but eg if Google can mitigate it centrally we might be better off, not worse off, as a whole. 

> On Sep 12, 2019, at 11:46, Dixon, Hugh <Hugh.Dixon=40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> 
> While tis true that there have always been other methods than Do53 for Malware C&C and exfil, the thing is that the existence of DoH services from Google (and other very large-scale internet entities) is (IMHO) quite a distinct change in the availability of
> *the combination of* :
> Conventionally-encrypted (as opposed to stick-out-like-a-sore-thumb custom/obscure)
> Unauthenticated but via “public” infrastructure
> Globally anycast-by-design (i.e. not trivially IP-detected-and-blocked like static IPs)
> A wide spread of steady-flow “genuine” traffic (e.g. 24h peak-to-mean of ~ 2 for example for DNS) in which to hide
>  
> And possibly other things.
>  
> That doesn’t mean DoH isn’t a good thing as a DNS-on-the-wire-privacy and recursor-authentication protocol (as of course all these features are also what make it a great protocol for attempting to prevent downgrade attacks by what The Internet would call bad (network/nation-state) actors).  However, it does beg the question of (all) operators of DoH infrastructure as to whether they are delivering “a better internet” if they ignore the assistance to criminals that they offer if they don’t actively take a role against them.
> Of course there’s an argument that a crook-enabling DoH server is better than an NXDOMAIN-hacking ISP DNS. And a lot of ISPs don’t do any actively-bad stuff with DNS data/responses but do apply malware mitigation.
>  
> To address the question, perhaps the “what can we do about mitigating the opportunities for harm generated through innovation?” is the better end point?
> H
>  
> On 10/09/2019, 16:14, "Add on behalf of Alec Muffett" <add-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of alec.muffett@gmail.com> wrote:
>  
> On Mon, 9 Sep 2019, 22:16 Bret Jordan, <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> Just making sure people here have seen this..
>  
> https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/psixbot-now-using-google-dns-over-https-and-possible-new-sexploitation-module
>  
>  
> One can only wonder how rapidly they adopted HTTPS to evade the "content fingerprinting" of anti-malware in the late 90s and early 2000s, and how the adoption curves compare?
>  
> Similarly for adopting Tor, also, of course. 
>  
> And WebRTC and Skype.
>  
> Not to mention those clever malware authors who hardcode IP addresses - that was a tremendous innovation in cyber badware.
>  
> Or were you suggesting that "innovation happens and bad people adopt it as well as good" somehow constitutes and argument towards some end?
>  
> -a
>  
>  
>  
>  
>  
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