Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: draft-grover-add-policy-detection-00

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Tue, 16 July 2019 20:48 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2019 13:47:48 -0700
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To: ek@loon.com
Cc: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>, add@ietf.org, "Dixon, Hugh" <Hugh.Dixon@sky.uk>, Alec Muffett <alec.muffett@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: draft-grover-add-policy-detection-00
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On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 1:37 PM Erik Kline <ek@loon.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, 16 Jul 2019 at 13:24, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 1:17 PM Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 1:11 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> In fairness, I'm not sure I quite follow. But, if I worked at a
>>>>> browser vendor, I would be worried about DoH rollout too. I think I'd
>>>>> gradually ratchet up the security signals in the location bar with the end
>>>>> result of marking sites insecure if their IP was fetched over DNS in the
>>>>> clear.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Ignoring the UI question, let me push a bit on "in the clear".
>>>>
>>>
>>> Sure, but I don't you should ignore the UI question. Having been on the
>>> receiving end of a few "why is the lock broken on our site?" emails from a
>>> CEO, I can tell you it is really effective.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Currently, resolvers are configured by IP address, not domain name.
>>>>
>>>
>>> This is true, so companies go for stuff like 1.1.1.1 and 8.8.8.8.
>>>
>>
>> Right, but if you're getting that out of DHCP, that doesn't help, because
>> you can't trust that.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> So absent mechanisms such as TRR, how does the DNS client form a secure
>>>> connection to the resolver? What domain name is in the certificate and how
>>>> does the client learn that domain name?
>>>>
>>>
>>> I agree that there's a bootstrapping problem, but I don't think this
>>> draft helps with that.
>>>
>>
>> I'm not saying it does. I'm just trying to work through the entire
>> problem. What I'm arguing here is that absent external configuration (e.g.,
>> DoH/TRR), there's no real way to get encrypted DNS that is secure against
>> active attack.
>>
>
> When we did the DNS-over-TLS config for Android we chose it be
> hostname-based, on the theory that you could bootstrap using the
> network-provided nameservers, DNSSEC (which, admittedly, Android didn't
> support), and TLS (including optional browser security measures on top,
> perhaps cert pinning, etc.)
>
> I couldn't see how to make it much better than that.
>

Yes, this is how Firefox works as well, but that requires someone to supply
Fx with the hostname.

-Ekr


> -Ekr
>>
>>
>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Rob
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> -Ekr
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> This is distinct from choosing a DNS vendor.
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks,
>>>>> Rob
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>> Add mailing list
>> Add@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/add
>>
>