Re: [Add] meeting hum: should the IETF take up this work?

[Bret Jordan <[e-mail]>]

I agree with Barbara.  Further, why is it so hard for us to acknowledge and document how this is going to impact operators and even give them some options?  What are we so afraid of?  Letting people know that we made a change that is going to impact them? 


Thanks,
Bret
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> On Jul 23, 2019, at 6:46 PM, STARK, BARBARA H <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> That’s like saying IETF should never have published BCP 38. What is BCP 38 (or any other BCP), if not policy?
> IETF absolutely is the right place to discuss BCPs related to technology that has the ability to massively impact the traffic patterns of the Internet and impact (in a very negative way) the experience of all users of the Internet. I’m *not* saying that it *will* have such a negative impact. But it absolutely has the ability. And it’s this *potential* that has all the network operators very worried.
>  
> The Internet ecosystem is built on the idea that the various participants can generally trust one another to participate in a way that benefits the Internet and its users.
> I don’t believe that any of the application developers participating in IETF want to damage the Internet or have a negative impact on users’ experiences.
> And I very much trust and like the people from Mozilla and Google and Cloudflare. They’re all super nice people who are great fun to drink beer with.
> But I don’t think they have the operational experience/knowledge to fully understand what might happen in various access networks (especially mobile networks) if they started defaulting all their application users to DNS servers outside the local (ISP, enterprise, university, etc.) network.
> The IETF is a place where we can and must have this discussion, so all parties can participate in understanding and mitigating the potential harm.
>  
> I’m also trying to understand why there seems to be resistance to providing ISPs with advice on deploying DoH. Who does it hurt to provide such advice, and why should it be improper for IETF to provide advice on deploying a protocol it has published? [Advice on how to deploy is absolutely a form of “policy”.]
> And why should an ISP DoH resolver or using regular DNS not be considered valid “choices” for a user to make?
> Barbara
>  
> From: Add <[e-mail]> On Behalf Of Rob Sayre
> Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2019 6:09 PM
> To: [e-mail]; Barry Leiba <[e-mail]>
> Subject: [Add] meeting hum: should the IETF take up this work?
>  
> Hi,
>  
> The IETF shouldn't take up work in reaction to non-technical (aka "policy") concerns about imminent deployment of an approved RFC. In this case, it's DoH (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8484 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_rfc8484&d=DwMFaQ&c=LFYZ-o9_HUMeMTSQicvjIg&r=LoGzhC-8sc8SY8Tq4vrfog&m=k1e1muHdqm-ONwR45wiuv8wXcq1yvfPjFbBIMZURbwM&s=JuF6FZ_JnOj3uIC39JSKJtDfgM-xXTh2hTl8LzaNwPY&e=>).
>  
> Mozilla's presentation accurately stated that DNS is no longer an effective control surface. It can't be, given that HTTPS is ubiquitous, and one can use it to tunnel any protocol.
>  
> thanks,
> Rob
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