Re: [Add] fixing coffee shop brokenness with DoH

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Wed, 24 July 2019 17:15 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 10:14:51 -0700
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To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
Cc: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>, "add@ietf.org" <add@ietf.org>, Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Add] fixing coffee shop brokenness with DoH
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On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 8:58 AM Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:

> There are a variety of attack scenarios to account for. DNSSEC is not
> useful for countering a fake NXDOMAIN attack when the attacker also
> controls the path and can prevent connection establishment.
>
> However, if the attacker is the resolver, and the resolver isn’t under the
> control of the path, then detecting a fake NXDOMAIN is useful.
>

How?

-Ekr


> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Jul 24, 2019, at 11:20 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 8:18 AM Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:
>
>> On Jul 24, 2019, at 11:10 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>
>> Sure. The case of interest here is that you have a client which wants to
>> connect to domain A and the resolver (or a network attacker) wants to stop
>> them.
>>
>> In the case where A is not DNSSEC signed, the attacker just sends
>> NXDOMAIN, which the client accepts and refuses to connect.
>>
>> In the case where A *is* DNSSEC signed, the attacker can also inject an
>> NXDOMAIN. DNSSEC of course won't validate, but the client still doesn't
>> have an IP address to connect to, so it's only recourse is to error out.
>> Now, it can show the user a different error than it did for NXDOMAIN, but
>> these errors tend to be fairly generic anyway (Firefox, for instance, shows
>> "Hmm. We’re having trouble finding that site."), so from the user
>> perspective these aren't really very different.
>>
>>
>> Ah, I see where the disconnect is.   Yes, if the resolver and the network
>> are controlled by the same entity, then DNSSEC doesn’t help you to get a
>> connection.
>>
>> However, if you are able to tunnel to a resolver that is not controlled
>> by the network operator, then this equivalence no longer exists.   In this
>> case, DNSSEC is useful for validating the NXDOMAIN, because the network
>> operator is not cooperating with the resolver operator.
>>
>
> I'm sorry, I think I'm confused. Where do you think the attacker is
> positioned?
>
> -Ekr
>
>