Re: [Add] [Ext] Draft Posting: CNAME Discovery of Local DoH Resolvers

[Tony Rutkowski <[e-mail]>]

Hi Paul,

Any view on a matter raised at the recent IAB session - to what extent 
are the behaviors here anticompetitive?

--amr

On 7/1/2020 6:29 PM, Paul Vixie wrote:
> On Wednesday, 1 July 2020 22:09:02 UTC Michael Richardson wrote:
>> Paul Vixie <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>      > do you see that problem as specific to IoT, or disjoint from RDNS
>>      > settings? (i do not.)
>>
>> In the IoT case, we need a good, autonomic mechanism to deploy network
>> configuration to devices in ways that they really understand.
>> (Such as your proxy-HTTP setting, which I entirely approve of).
>>
>> Getting the wrong RDNS settings on an IoT device means that it probably does
>> not function well (or maybe at all), and it becomes very difficult to do
>> RFC8520.  (see my draft-richardson-opsawg-mud-iot-dns-considerations-02 )
> speaking as someone who had to create a local responder for 8.8.8.8 in order
> to get my chromecast to believe it had internet connectivity, i think we
> should consider that in the IoT world, there will never be profit from the
> delivery and sale of these devices, only from the services they can offer, and
> the phone-home telemetry they can monetize. google's chromecast already
> ignores the RDNS settings it gets from my DHCP service. therefore, "wrong" is
> in the eye of the beholder, and the interests of IoT buyers are unaligned with
> the interests of IoT sellers. we should consider this negotiation a "hostile"
> one.
>
>> Getting the wrong RDNS settings on a *desktop* browser is a qualitatively
>> different thing in my opinion.  It probably operates, but for some
>> uses/users it may be a problem, either because of the click-trail it
>> leaves, or because of the censorship that the user experiences.
>>
>> I think that this is particularly acute for *desktop* browsers, as they do
>> not in general have the luxury of just picking a different coffee shop.
>> The people who use them are generally vulnerable in a variety of different
>> ways.
> at the moment, i challenge your specificity here. laptops and smartphones and
> datapads all behave the way you're describing for desktops here.
>
> in the future, i will challenge any specificity on this topic, since all nodes
> whether embedded or operated will have the same capabilities and constraints.
>
>> It is *important* for the browser to be able to clearly indicate what level
>> of privacy is being experienced.
> i expect that you can get universal agreement on that point. in any case, +1.
>