IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [Add] fixing coffee shop brokenness with DoH

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Wed, 24 July 2019 17:24 UTC

Return-Path: <mellon@fugue.com>
X-Original-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C67A12028E for <add@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 24 Jul 2019 10:24:36 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.897
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.897 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MIME_QP_LONG_LINE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=fugue-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 50Ojc7PU9vwv for <add@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 24 Jul 2019 10:24:33 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-oi1-x235.google.com (mail-oi1-x235.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::235]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CD0F3120112 for <add@ietf.org>; Wed, 24 Jul 2019 10:24:33 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-oi1-x235.google.com with SMTP id m202so35601420oig.6 for <add@ietf.org>; Wed, 24 Jul 2019 10:24:33 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=fugue-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=/FchaHR6l0ZgS63b+eV+RtK+IhJrfpK5Bs59kNxgjmc=; b=SO2xAB6uLPeoH+KapI14tUM8+sxAbAT6K4dbanOq1U+796kAFrRylGA6rt4znXFiPB VA37j1lpmssEY+TEjOPU4F35Ibpb6S1hzXyMVhdbZFyC9gf42CxoX7Ts4g9psFfJ2SDi rwSa0oTLVBhi5ccGW75NdsyZA5HxzXyTHL4qGwC/kf700Gbw2tSngHOusAGe2WJz3jqw mj0ZD8So6mAWcAKQGgn8FHGs3A3nXl7ae5yRopeKaJpIp6pwjkkb2ryqgLRlo9ejNmix j6zdg8fmZctXI2wOhsd02gbNHJ/zYMpcDJ8KJSBAFjR4jNHmAWkFVg3SSwd/v+v2cA0L o9dA==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=/FchaHR6l0ZgS63b+eV+RtK+IhJrfpK5Bs59kNxgjmc=; b=ECecDYxd6WIeBzVJGXTddW4Fl6yL/5uqLkCYET7arVN2Zddk4kML9cfAnUL4Mr6VPq 7XVg+M9KzFunfwae55Jm7zimdJjZ/kQRI2EsKZVrWmh4JqJbzkIwxBFWoh3I6kAUn7bv V7FNXaMpKeroslxD0nkQ0t+wYTwT/yRRFkcHDclM4BlcKouqVdiPZG5VVKFBh0VN65cT 3ZyU5NNqLeI15Mvn5komk+MOo9A+JQCc7h97D5LB/AGheA0j+ZlpNJnzA8DqA99TaQVm BA5TJjwYQ8q7JYOwElcbevOO1op3kKLlgcT2zRKN+E6zF0z7zMhx1UE3HNOAZWhMJu/U l1eQ==
X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWTV/xEjgx+6N4a7YdcCSy09N3OHwUZ709e8zuGTiP/n52Cf7Qz vdrk5z3r87r+az3uW5yh4oftBobuyDvj0A==
X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxa8e9AJJ7e2droR7g5z7lpMZrB91QBoEOV/EruHjseDod90xMRLIPh0Vi1NTSRKkqkDIL0+Q==
X-Received: by 2002:aca:aad3:: with SMTP id t202mr44120600oie.158.1563989072931; Wed, 24 Jul 2019 10:24:32 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ?IPv6:2600:380:7d3e:cb8c:35a2:a993:a100:bb7e? ([2600:380:7d3e:cb8c:35a2:a993:a100:bb7e]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 9sm14908009oij.25.2019.07.24.10.24.32 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 24 Jul 2019 10:24:32 -0700 (PDT)
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail-3A6047CD-3BC0-4B3D-8BDB-3DC383F3B8F6"
Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0)
From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (16G77)
In-Reply-To: <CABcZeBM8bY0bjZjgpozMULL++4v98SO-tyFnqYvG0714GqWgbw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 13:24:30 -0400
Cc: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>, "add@ietf.org" <add@ietf.org>, Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <A0C71399-5BB9-4296-AE26-202725E4A425@fugue.com>
References: <CAChr6Sx9TEt6CMzRRrdb-HwT_k987oW=4yF1FCbDF17zkaE2Vg@mail.gmail.com> <2D09D61DDFA73D4C884805CC7865E6114E23910C@GAALPA1MSGUSRBF.ITServices.sbc.com> <14DF8769-A817-4C06-9140-80198518244F@akamai.com> <CAChr6SzH1EycAr5n+dK5BQcG=0Zsw66qE=8Rptvq7SEoEvQQ=Q@mail.gmail.com> <E5A0DAE2-A718-41EA-B490-58ABD0F31CF2@rfc1035.com> <CABcZeBMqvZivS_Hk_2mSOAOnM+mHy1mtcwnHVFc14v_jdkgU=Q@mail.gmail.com> <4DE9B8B1-36D5-4EB5-BE84-D61C182F7372@fugue.com> <CABcZeBN+4RGWN0+xhtb-bMtSJ1B0FAU4JjRJTOSd1x_9JJZBWg@mail.gmail.com> <D361E72B-3783-4E57-8F08-8B418639BB29@fugue.com> <CABcZeBP2MY3pjeZv4Q+1Kj3_GKOgVq8+OYe7im2gYvBzy=Mz7g@mail.gmail.com> <F8A56D5D-B05E-4E80-880C-60D6B550F107@fugue.com> <CABcZeBOO5yvcm=DvDjr-7v4AvVG=13Zy--j362eE0Qqp7hcRaw@mail.gmail.com> <4FC4184E-E41D-420E-A594-60ECF3CD73F1@fugue.com> <CABcZeBOjWQr1HWbGaCkpdR1S7FQUmum=by_SOYWB9OENy8Y-hA@mail.gmail.com> <7BE32238-2442-4954-B95E-1C089C8C86E7@fugue.com> <CABcZeBM8bY0bjZjgpozMULL++4v98SO-tyFnqYvG0714GqWgbw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/add/Rk-zXAAmSvgWHQ_VTnvvV6BGn7I>
Subject: Re: [Add] fixing coffee shop brokenness with DoH
X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Applications Doing DNS <add.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/add>, <mailto:add-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/add/>
List-Post: <mailto:add@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:add-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/add>, <mailto:add-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 17:24:37 -0000

On Jul 24, 2019, at 1:14 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>> On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 8:58 AM Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:
>> There are a variety of attack scenarios to account for. DNSSEC is not useful for countering a fake NXDOMAIN attack when the attacker also controls the path and can prevent connection establishment.
>> 
>> However, if the attacker is the resolver, and the resolver isn’t under the control of the path, then detecting a fake NXDOMAIN is useful. 
> 
> How?

It allows me to notice that the resolver I have chosen is not trustworthy. If E.g. Firefox did this, it would make lying public DoH resolvers untenable.

I think there’s also a belief that PKI is so trustworthy that we need not backstop it. I think this is a mistake.

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email