Re: [Add] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-mglt-abcd-doh-privacy-analysis-00.txt

Bob Harold <rharolde@umich.edu> Wed, 06 November 2019 19:35 UTC

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From: Bob Harold <rharolde@umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 06 Nov 2019 14:35:16 -0500
Message-ID: <CA+nkc8Aw+PPktomjwydWtfvVyM6Phhn9YbL33WV65-sbS0k1AA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Tommy Jensen <Jensen.Thomas=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Daniel Migault <daniel.migault=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "add@ietf.org" <add@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-mglt-abcd-doh-privacy-analysis-00.txt
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On Wed, Nov 6, 2019 at 2:10 PM Tommy Jensen <Jensen.Thomas=
40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Hey Daniel,
>
> Adding onto Stephen's comments (+1 to not sure what the goal of this
> document is), I'll point out a reoccurrence of the common but false
> assumption that DoH always means browsers and always means centralization:
>
> draft>> DoH changes this paradigm in the way that an application can
> circumvent the policy set by the end user, without the end user being aware
> of it.  Firstly, the encryption is performed by the application and as such
> does not provide any visibility to the operating system.
>
> DoH doesn't change this paradigm at all, as it isn't a protocol just for
> apps (see the Adaptive DNS proposal for an example of a platform providing
> DoH). This problem (apps doing their own DNS and circumventing system
> configured policy) existed before and continues to exist with classic DNS;
> it just so happened that the traffic was plain text so any network sniffing
> software could observe and possibly modify or block it. I consider that an
> unfortunate side effect of plain text protocols, not a feature we should be
> working to preserve. It's not like apps doing their own DNS queries today
> are visible to most users today, who don't know what packet inspection is.
>
> I think if we drive widespread adoption of encrypted DNS protocols by
> platforms and ISPs, we'll have better luck convincing well-behaved
> applications to defer to platform configurations than any other approach.
> After all, why build per-app experiences if the platform experience is
> already "good" in the eyes of the privacy conscious? This will address the
> concern of centralization of the DNS as well (which is not an inherent DoH
> problem, but an inherent "default provider for all customers of X
> app/platform" problem).
>
> As far as ill-behaved applications go, they were going to do whatever they
> wanted anyway, and pushing DoH adoption doesn't give them powers they
> didn't already have. At some point, the problem becomes one of the user
> needing to decide what apps they trust which we cannot help with via
> protocol design.
>

I agree with most of your points - but here you say "pushing DoH adoption
doesn't give them powers they didn't already have".  One concern is IF some
major web service enables DoH on a major web server, then that does make it
very easy for apps to hide their DNS in a way they could not easily do
before.

-- 
Bob Harold


>
> Thanks,
> Tommy
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Add <add-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Stephen Farrell <
> stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 6, 2019 6:20 AM
> *To:* Daniel Migault <daniel.migault=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>;
> add@ietf.org <add@ietf.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [Add] Fwd: New Version Notification for
> draft-mglt-abcd-doh-privacy-analysis-00.txt
>
>
> Hi Daniel,
>
> On 05/11/2019 20:40, Daniel Migault wrote:
> > Please find an analysis on DoH and privacy. The intent is to provide an
> > analysis. Any feed backs are welcome!
>
> My feedback:
>
> - I don't see how this adds to the discussion. ISTM this
> is yet another one-sided description of the issues. What do
> you think is the added benefit of having this text in an
> Internet-draft? Honestly, I don't get it.
>
> - In particular, I don't think your "conclusion" that "the
> overall picture of concentration shows that it represents
> a threat to the end user's privacy" can be justified based
> on the content. I'm assuming "represents a threat" is not
> just weasel-wording for "might be" which is trivially
> true. If you mean anything stronger than "might be" then
> that's not justified IMO and if you mean "might be" or
> anything weaker, then it looks like stretching to find
> a pejorative way to describe things.
>
> Cheers,
> S.
>
> PS: In saying the above, I do think there are dangers in
> how DoH deployments might increase centralisation. But I
> also think that one-sided descriptions of those dangers
> make the conversations more, and not less, difficult.
>
> >
> > Yours,
> > Daniel
> > ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> > From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> > Date: Mon, Nov 4, 2019 at 11:20 AM
> > Subject: New Version Notification for
> > draft-mglt-abcd-doh-privacy-analysis-00.txt
> > To: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
> >
> >
> >
> > A new version of I-D, draft-mglt-abcd-doh-privacy-analysis-00.txt
> > has been successfully submitted by Daniel Migault and posted to the
> > IETF repository.
> >
> > Name:           draft-mglt-abcd-doh-privacy-analysis
> > Revision:       00
> > Title:          A privacy analysis on DoH deployment
> > Document date:  2019-11-04
> > Group:          Individual Submission
> > Pages:          11
> > URL:
> >
> https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf.org%2Finternet-drafts%2Fdraft-mglt-abcd-doh-privacy-analysis-00.txt&amp;data=02%7C01%7CJensen.Thomas%40microsoft.com%7Ce85f2b5a2eec4a50d4de08d762c47bcc%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637086471402836031&amp;sdata=w7GwUhz%2BIVSB5VW%2BtyEKvAUjTTh%2BNhq12tpVbM5Zw0o%3D&amp;reserved=0
> > Status:
> >
> https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fdraft-mglt-abcd-doh-privacy-analysis%2F&amp;data=02%7C01%7CJensen.Thomas%40microsoft.com%7Ce85f2b5a2eec4a50d4de08d762c47bcc%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637086471402836031&amp;sdata=XmWL4PabqWROpOd1YmGsKfQ9ucjP16tanC5PnTuewAw%3D&amp;reserved=0
> > Htmlized:
> >
> https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftools.ietf.org%2Fhtml%2Fdraft-mglt-abcd-doh-privacy-analysis-00&amp;data=02%7C01%7CJensen.Thomas%40microsoft.com%7Ce85f2b5a2eec4a50d4de08d762c47bcc%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637086471402836031&amp;sdata=tpXDCA5qibyJU0%2FBcvkCHxRoKhWTZYi9s4fln0MQLx8%3D&amp;reserved=0
> > Htmlized:
> >
> https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Fdraft-mglt-abcd-doh-privacy-analysis&amp;data=02%7C01%7CJensen.Thomas%40microsoft.com%7Ce85f2b5a2eec4a50d4de08d762c47bcc%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637086471402836031&amp;sdata=l4GflUzS14Z68kdSWxLzCjIYKoHWtY%2BwxFxCO5FY%2FEY%3D&amp;reserved=0
> >
> >
> > Abstract:
> >    This document provides an analysis on DoH impact on privacy
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission
> > until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> >
> > The IETF Secretariat
> >
> >
> --
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