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[Add] meeting hum: should the IETF take up this work?

Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> Tue, 23 July 2019 22:09 UTC

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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2019 15:09:20 -0700
Message-ID: <CAChr6Sx9TEt6CMzRRrdb-HwT_k987oW=4yF1FCbDF17zkaE2Vg@mail.gmail.com>
To: add@ietf.org, Barry Leiba <barryleiba.mailing.lists@gmail.com>
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Subject: [Add] meeting hum: should the IETF take up this work?
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Hi,

The IETF shouldn't take up work in reaction to non-technical (aka "policy")
concerns about imminent deployment of an approved RFC. In this case, it's
DoH (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8484).

Mozilla's presentation accurately stated that DNS is no longer an effective
control surface. It can't be, given that HTTPS is ubiquitous, and one can
use it to tunnel any protocol.

thanks,
Rob

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