Re: [Add] My principles for discovery

[Ben Schwartz <[e-mail]>]

On Wed, Mar 25, 2020 at 3:33 AM Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola=
[e-mail]> wrote:

>
>
> > Il 25/03/2020 05:36 Martin Thomson <[e-mail]> ha scritto:
> >
> >
> > As I raised this in the meeting, I think that it's only fair that I
> include what I think the principles should be.
> >
> > In short, I believe that any entity that you interact with should be
> able to present their views on what resolver you should use.  Client policy
> will then dictate which - if any - of those is used.
>
> I don't necessarily disagree with the approach, but there is a question to
> which I need a very convincing answer first.
>
> "Any entity you interact with" already has a way to tell you - even force
> you - to use a name server they control to effect resolution of their
> domain names. It's called "authoritative name server".
>
> It seems to me that the model that especially draft-pauly is proposing -
> i.e. every destination pointing the client to a resolver that the
> destination controls - is functionally equivalent, in terms of who gets to
> see which information, to eliminating the concept of an external resolver
> and having the end-user device implement and run a full resolver on its own.
>
> This, as per Tommy's reply to the question I made at IETF 106, would
> increase privacy because the resolution process would not provide data to
> any other party than the "final destination", which would anyway get it
> when the following HTTPS connection happens. (The fact that the two sets of
> data are actually the same has been challenged yesterday in the Jabber
> chat, but that's another discussion.)
>
> I assume that this is also what you are envisaging, since the alternative
> - every destination pointing the client to a resolver which they don't
> control, but with which they have commercial or other agreements - opens up
> the potential for much heavier security threat, centralization and
> surveillance scenarios than it is ever possible today, so I would expect it
> to be ruled out much like other out-of-same-origin practices.
>

I don't think this is a meaningful distinction.  Authoritative nameserver
operations are commonly outsourced and heavily consolidated today, just as
web hosting is commonly outsourced to large CDNs.  There's certainly no
"out-of-same-origin" rule that prevents using a CDN!


> So - why do we need to develop all this complex machinery just to let
> destinations indicate some kind of resolver that does the same thing that
> their authoritative already does? What's the difference with just
> implementing a full resolver in the client?
>

I actually agree, at least in part: as our proposals develop, we should try
to harmonize them with the work to encrypt recursive->authoritative DNS
queries.  Perhaps we will be able to build encrypted stub, recursive, and
hybrid resolvers from a small set of shared components.


>
> --
>
> Vittorio Bertola | Head of Policy & Innovation, Open-Xchange
> [e-mail]
> Office @ Via Treviso 12, 10144 Torino, Italy
>
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