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Re: [Add] fixing coffee shop brokenness with DoH

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Thu, 25 July 2019 15:07 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, add@ietf.org
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Comments: In-reply-to Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> message dated "Thu, 25 Jul 2019 10:59:55 -0400."
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Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2019 11:08:15 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Add] fixing coffee shop brokenness with DoH
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Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
    > What percentage of hijacked connections due to maliciously modified DNS 
    > is within your breakage budget? In other words, how do you balance
    > security 
    > versus user convenience? A certificate that has expired only two hours
    > ago seem to be fine to hard fail on. But a broken DNS transport is not?

I agree.
I wish it was Applications Doing DNSSEC, and DNSSEC-over-HTTPS/TLS.

It seems that once it's in the Application, that doing DNSSEC intelligently
is much easier.

-- 
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks [ 
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect  [ 
]     mcr@sandelman.ca  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails    [

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