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Re: [Add] fixing coffee shop brokenness with DoH

Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> Wed, 24 July 2019 02:16 UTC

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From: Bret Jordan <jordan.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2019 22:16:28 -0400
In-Reply-To: <CAChr6SzvUZS4Ru_SttiZgWtjwBuLrzc_fdewq9w-Ts+Rq_oNHw@mail.gmail.com>
Cc: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>, "add@ietf.org" <add@ietf.org>
To: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Add] fixing coffee shop brokenness with DoH
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Well to use the argument that others have used, why not just use VPN in your coffee shop?


Thanks,
Bret
PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
"Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."

> On Jul 23, 2019, at 10:07 PM, Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 6:50 PM Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com <mailto:jim@rfc1035.com>> wrote:
> It didn't/doesn't take or need DoH (or DoT) to fix that problem.
> 
> DNS has had 31 years to fix the problem. It's still just unencrypted coffee shop traffic, right?
>  
> Though of course I'm glad we've got DoT and DoH as new weapons in the on-going security arms race.
> 
> That's not clear to me.
>  
> BTW, using DoH or DoT in the above scenario doesn't necessarily make things "secure". It just changes the security landscape by swapping one set of concerns for another. A cynic (or realist) would say they'd just replaced one DNS resolver they probably didn't/shouldn't trust to another that isn't necessarily more trustworthy.
> 
> It does avoid a variety of local attacks.
>  
> Unless DNSSEC validation is used
> 
> Uh, no.
> 
> thanks,
> Rob 
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