Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: Malware adopting DoH

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Fri, 13 September 2019 16:29 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2019 11:29:26 -0500
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To: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
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Subject: Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: Malware adopting DoH
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On Sep 13, 2019, at 10:58, Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:
>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 15:53, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Jim, this is just a non sequitur.   For the case of blocking malware, if the malware has fewer choices, it is easier, not harder, to block.
> 
> I’m not so sure it is a non-sequitur Ted. Aside from the competition/consolidation concerns which may well be out of scope for the IETF, centralisation is bad engineering because it introduces avoidable single points of failure. And control.
> 

Yes. That’s why malware using centralized services is good: because it’s bad engineering. It makes them vulnerable. 

I suspect that on the long run this will turn out to be a mistake on the malware authors’ part.