Re: [alto] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-alto-cost-calendar-17

Mirja Kuehlewind <ietf@kuehlewind.net> Mon, 02 March 2020 18:22 UTC

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From: Mirja Kuehlewind <ietf@kuehlewind.net>
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Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2020 19:22:04 +0100
Cc: Vijay Gurbani <vijay.gurbani@gmail.com>, Brian Weis <bew.stds@gmail.com>, IETF ALTO <alto@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-alto-cost-calendar.all@ietf.org
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To: "Y. Richard Yang" <yry@cs.yale.edu>
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Subject: Re: [alto] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-alto-cost-calendar-17
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If these stay the only changes, we can add them as RFC editor notes without the need to upload a new version.

Mirja



> On 2. Mar 2020, at 19:12, Y. Richard Yang <yry@cs.yale.edu> wrote:
> 
> Thanks a lot, Vijay! The edit looks good.
> 
> We will commit the edit when we upload a new version on Thursday.
> Richard
> 
> On Mon, Mar 2, 2020 at 10:02 AM Vijay Gurbani <vijay.gurbani@gmail.com> wrote:
> Dear Richard: I will suggest a couple of minor modifications:
> 
> New paragraph:
> 
>   The operator should be should be cognizant that the preceding mechanisms
>    do not address all security risks. In particular, they will not help in 
>    the case of “malicious clients” possessing valid credentials to
>    authenticate. The threat here can be that legitimate clients have
>    become subverted by an attacker and are now ‘bots’ being asked to
>    participate in a DDoS attack. The Calendar information would be valuable
>    information for when to persecute a DDoS attack. A mechanism such as
>    a monitoring system that detects abnormal behaviors may still be needed."
> 
> Suggested changes:
>   The operator should be should be cognizant that the preceding mechanisms
>    do not address all security risks. In particular, they will not help in 
>    the case of “malicious clients” possessing valid authentication credentials.
>    The threat here is that legitimate clients have become subverted by an attacker 
>    and are now ‘bots’ being asked to participate in a DDoS attack. The Calendar 
>    information now becomes valuable in knowing exactly when to perpetrate a DDoS 
>   attack.  A mechanism such as a monitoring system that detects abnormal 
>   behaviors may still be needed.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> - vijay
> 
> [ Trimmed the Cc list to avoid email explosion on a minor change. ]
> 
>  
> 
> 
> -- 
> -- 
>  =====================================
> | Y. Richard Yang <yry@cs.yale.edu>   |
> | Professor of Computer Science       |
> | http://www.cs.yale.edu/~yry/        |
>  =====================================