[Anima-bootstrap] DRAFT minutes up to 2016-09-13

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Thu, 15 September 2016 00:05 UTC

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Subject: [Anima-bootstrap] DRAFT minutes up to 2016-09-13
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This set of minutes covers meetings in August 2016 and September 2016,
up to September 13, 2016.  Warning: fixed-width ASCII art, pick the right
font, or it will probably be unreadable.  Please contribute corrections.

Previous minutes were posted on August 16 for meetings after IETF96.

A history of meetings covered:
  2016-08-23 - Max, Kent, mcr on mobile
  2016-08-30 - mcr away camping, Max got dragged elsewhere, meeting
               was cancelled.
  2016-09-06 - Max, Kent, mcr
  2016-09-13 - Max, Kent, mcr, Toerless, Michael Behringer (muted entire time?)

Future meetings:
  2016-09-20, 2016-09-27, 2016-10-04, 2016-10-11,
  2016-10-18, 2016-10-25, 2016-11-01.
  2016-11-08 -- cancelled, too close to IETF97.

0) the old webex expired, and a new one was created.

1) The chairs queried us about whether we were "done yet", and the answer was
   that we need another two weeks to beat on your document.
   EXEC SUMMARY:  We have essentially specified pretty much everything,
                  but some doubts have arrived as to whether our chosen
                  architecture and technologies are the best, and we are
                  letting ourselves decide if there are some critical
                  decisions we should revise NOW.
                  In particular, those decisions align the technology better
                  with both NETCONF and IoT needs, and may be also result
                  in a simpler security footprint.

  2016-08-23 - Max, Kent, mcr on mobile
  2016-08-30 - mcr away camping
  2016-09-06 - Max, Kent, mcr
  2016-09-13 - Max, Kent, mcr, Toerless, Michael Behringer (muted entire time?)

2) At the 2016-08-16, as previously minuted, the decision arrived that we
want to have a WG document (Informational) about the ownership voucher.
During subsequent discussions, further discussions suggest that in fact it is
not a private matter, and that it probably (reading between lines) should
be a standards track specification, or a reference to such a document.

It was suggested that OAUTH bound tokens might provide the right model,
or perhaps JSON Web Tokens, or ???


We discussed whether we could just have the ownership voucher definition
pasted into the BRSKI document in a way that made it clear it was mostly
identical to the netconf format, but the pushback was that having it in
a clear document referenced by both made it clear that it was the same thing.
The value of having a single document was mostly a process simplification
concern, and letting us move forward.

ACTION: Kent said he would start a document in his git repo, but I don't
        think that actually happened yet, unless it was system-keychain?

3) mcr was uncomfortable with the level of detail/protocol around getting
   the pledge to put the "right things" into the CSR.

A number pointers were inserted into the notes:


  section https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-system-keychain-00#section-2.3

includes YANG action statement "generate-certifacte-signing-request" that
takes input PKCS#10 structures 'subject' and 'attributes', and generates
output structure 'certificate-signing-request' (the CSR itself).

ACTION ITEM (max): form an articulate position on how this push model
         discussion migth integrate with the anima pull model -- as a thought

         NOTE from mcr: 6tisch would prefer a pull model (server/NMS
                  initiated) as well for bandwidth management reasons, and
                  I'm trying to reverse it back to client initiated, with
                  some way to manage bandwidth...

4) the 2016-09-06 and 2016-09-13 meetings dealt a lot with the notion of
   roles and role reversals, and much terminology was abused, and confused.

We wrote some definitions, which are reorganized in these minutes as follows:

Actors are: 1) new device ("pledge")
            2) registrar (ANIMA term)
               management system (NETCONF) ("NMS")
               JCE (6tisch)

The roles that can be taken are:
a) TCP-initiator ("SYN")
b) TCP-responder ("SYN+ACK")
c) TLS-client
d) TLS-server
e) HTTP client/CoAP client
f) HTTP server/CoAP server
g) RESTCONF client / 6p client
h) RESTCONF server / 6p server
i) EST (7030) client
j) EST (7030) server

I) The ANIMA cast list is as follows:
    i) pledge is TCP-initiator, TLS-client, HTTP/EST client.
   ii) registar is TCP-responder, TLS-server, EST server.

II) In NETCONF, cast list is as follows:
    i) pledge is TCP-initiator, TLS-server, RESTCONF server.
   ii) NMS is TCP-responder, TLS-client, RESTCONF client.

III) In 6tisch, cast list is as follows:
    i) pledge is DAD-client, DTLS-server, CoAP server, 6p server.
   ii) JCE is DTLS-client, CoAP-client, 6p client.
      [Only maybe DTLS is replaced with EDHOC]

We had some significant discussions about the advantage of the NETCONF
"call-home" role reversal, and explained in this time sequence diagram that
has the TCP and TLS activities:

FIGURE 20160906: Solution Overview

           Server (h)                        Client (g)
        (anima new device)                  (anima registrar)
         |                                    |
         |         1. TCP                     |
         |-------------SYN------------------->|  Just a SYN, SYN/ACK.
         |                                    |
         |                                    |
         |         2. SSH/TLS                 |
         |<------------ClientHello------------| same TCP connection.
         |-------------ServerHello-(cert)---->| Registrar verifies
         |                                    |  802.1AR cert, and
         |                                    |  obtains auth token
         |<------------client cert------------| <- client cert
         |                                    |    = ownership voucher/auth
         |                                    |      token
         |<------------extension auth token---| * modification or
         |                                    |   extensions to TLS handshake
         |                                    |
         |                                    |  (NOTE: This is an idea
         |                                    |    around optimizing the
         |                                    |  initial authentication.
         |                                    |   netconf/restconf
         |                                    |   DOES NOT explore this either)
         |   continue with BRSKI or           |
         |          NETCONF/RESTCONF etc:     |
         |         3. NETCONF/RESTCONF        |
         |                                    |
         Note: arrows point from the "client" to
          the "server" at each protocol layer

It was noting:  By flipping the TLS connection the handshake works out nicely
   in our favor: the TLSCertificate payload is the 802.1AR cert and then
   *after* it is authenticated the client could respond with the ownership
   voucher cert  assuming the necessary extension could be defined.

some additional TLS time sequence diagrams:
or   http://etutorials.org/shared/images/tutorials/tutorial_113/09fig03.gif
or   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5878#section-6

Compare this to the flow in BRSKI:

at about:
      |            TLS via the Circuit Proxy    |
      |<--Registrar TLS server authentication---|
      |                                         |
  [PROVISIONAL accept of server cert]           |
      P                                         |
      P---IEEE 802.1AR client authentication--->|
      P                                         |

[then doing REST stuff to get out of P state]

We discussed at length: Is this optimization worth pursuing NOW or can it be
                        handled as a true optimization in later work?

                        ** delaying this incurs technical debt **

It might involve the REST interface being flipped. This makes re-use of
existing libraries harder.

This netconf draft addresses how the interface might be implmented:
(thus DRAFT vs EST RFC7030)

Our path to RFC is quicker/easier if we reference RFCs.
But this role reversal isn't a bad idea at all!!!

But from this it appears that the “server” is consistently the device. See also:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6241 (netconf)
  “the client can be a script or
   application typically running as part of a network manager.  The
   server is typically a network device.  The terms "device" and
   "server" are used interchangeably in this document”

QUESTION: in all of netconf/restconf is the device always passive?

ACTION ITEM FOR MAX: Continue this conversastion with a more detailed
       discussion of what the netconf provisional state actually is (they
       don't spell it out).

Tentative plan: maintain current flows and work toward optimization in
          netconf by partnering with netconf folks?

5) We discussed:

  https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-system-keychain-00 could
      replace [suppliment]  EST, but needs some extensions for ANIMA.

      (It can't replace because the server isn't long term appropriate for
       knowing when the client needs to obtain a new cert etc. I think its

  This is contrasted to netconf, where the management infrastructure is
  driving the state machine.  So the mgmt drives to push the initial

  But, certificates have lifetimes, and (unless they are ~infinite~), the
  client knows when it needs to renew the certificate, and so it still has to
  have a state machine to enable to renew.

  Renew is built-in to EST, but system-keychain doesn't deal with it?
  Kent: client can send notification, but agrees that client has to initiate
          the callback, so that the NMS can push a new certificate down.

A lot of the discussion then revolved around if we could reduce the
time/complexity of the provisional state, as it is a likely avenue of attack
or implementation flaws.

   - flipping the TLS connection and having a TLS extension for the auth
   token / ownership voucher this would require a new doc for a TLS extension.

                |   Start      |
                |              |
                |  Discover    |
   +------------>              |
   |            +------+-------+
   |                   |
   |            +------v-------+
   |            |  Identity    |
   ^------------+              |
   | rejected   +------+-------+
   |                   |           <-- 1. moving imprint to here as part of
   |                   |                   TLS handshake this reduces the
   |                   |                   provisional state.
   |            +------v-------+    This is an interesting/great/cool
   |            |              |    optimization but would slow us down a lot
   |            |              |     to define the needed extension auth token.
   |            | Request      |
   |            | Join         |
   |            +------+-------+
   |                   |
   |            +------v-------+
   |            |  Imprint     |   Optional
   ^------------+              <--+Manual input
   | Bad Vendor +------+-------+
   | response          |
   |            +------v-------+
   |            |  Enroll      | <-- 2. should this be driven by the
   |            |              |     registrar/netconf style server
   ^------------+              |     as server side state
   |            |              |     (e.g. netconf-system-keychain)
   | Enroll     +------+-------+     this is implied because the order of
   |                   |             the TLS in netconf call home
   | Failure           |             but we could swap the roles again
   |                   |             to get back to EST (current anima draft)
   |            +------v-------+
   |            |  Being       |
   ^------------+  Managed     |
    Factory     +--------------+

We discussed the question as to whether or not a decision about 1,
and 2 were linked in any way?  Does TRUE(1) force TRUE(2)? (NO)
Does FALSE(2) imply FALSE(1)?  (NO)

ACTION ITEM for MCR: Can we use RFC5878 (SAML) to replace ownership / auth
                     token extension need?

Here is a TLS State diagram adapted from RFC5878, section 6, anotated
to include where the provision state would be.

Client                                                   Server

    ClientHello (no extensions) -------->                            |0
                                        ServerHello (no extensions)  |0
                                                       Certificate*  |0
                                                 ServerKeyExchange*  |0
                                                CertificateRequest*  |0
                                <--------           ServerHelloDone  |0
    Certificate*                                                     |0
    ClientKeyExchange                                                |0
    CertificateVerify*                                               |0
    [ChangeCipherSpec]                                               |0
    Finished                    -------->                            |1
                                                 [ChangeCipherSpec]  |0
                                <--------                  Finished  |1

                  { THIS IS PROVISIONAL STATE!!!! }

    ClientHello (w/ extensions) -------->                            |1
                                        ServerHello (w/ extensions)  |1
                                  SupplementalData (w/ authz data)*  |1
                                                       Certificate*  |1
                                                 ServerKeyExchange*  |1
                                                CertificateRequest*  |1
                                <--------           ServerHelloDone  |1
    SupplementalData (w/ authz data)*                                |1
    Certificate*                                                     |1
    ClientKeyExchange                                                |1
    CertificateVerify*                                               |1
    [ChangeCipherSpec]                                               |1
    Finished                    -------->                            |2
                                                 [ChangeCipherSpec]  |1
                                <--------                  Finished  |2

SAML would work well, if a bit verbose, but this will fail for
bearer tokens!!!
JWT might be simpler.

    PLEDGE                                                REGISTRAR
                                <--MITM-- ClientHello (w/ extensions)

    ServerHello (no extensions) ---MITM->
    Certificate (IDevID)
    ServerKeyExchange* (DH)
                                <X-MITM--  SupplementalData (w/ authz data)*

                                <---MITM   ClientHello

    Finished                    ---MITM->
                           <CRYPTO STARTS HERE>

Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-