Re: [Anima-bootstrap] AN Group Key

Brian E Carpenter <> Mon, 24 October 2016 18:57 UTC

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To: "Max Pritikin (pritikin)" <>
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From: Brian E Carpenter <>
Organization: University of Auckland
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Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2016 07:57:33 +1300
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Subject: Re: [Anima-bootstrap] AN Group Key
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Hi Max,

Thanks. I don't propose anything for now, but maybe this could be an idea for
future work. Since GRASP does rely on link-local multicast, it would be good
to have some idea of how to secure it (if the ACP doesn't take care of
it for us).


On 25/10/2016 06:32, Max Pritikin (pritikin) wrote:
> BRSKI bootstraps a public key identity for the domain. It then rolls into a local certificate distribution but as currently noted in s5.7:
>    The prior sections provide functionality for the New Entity to obtain
>    a trust anchor representative of the Domain.  The following section
>    describe using EST to obtain a locally issued PKI certificate.  The
>    New Entity MAY perform alternative enrollment methods or proceed to
>    use its IDevID credential indefinately, but those that leverage the
>    discovered Registrar to proceed with certificate enrollment MUST
>    implement the following EST choices.
> The exact wording here could be adjusted. The point is that once the domain trust anchor is bootstrapped a mandatory to implement, or highly recommended interoperable approach, to identifying the device be implemented. 
> One could branch off here into a group key method or could distribute the certs and use them to engage with a group key model. 
> - max
>> On Oct 22, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Brian E Carpenter <> wrote:
>> This is perhaps a bit of a side track, but is there a way to leverage the
>> BRSKI registrar to securely distribute a Group Key? If every node in an AN
>> domain had the same Group Key, we could make GRASP multicast secure.
>> (I never followed the MSEC work, but it looks mighty complex.)
>> Regards
>>   Brian Carpenter
>> _______________________________________________
>> Anima-bootstrap mailing list